Thank god, all of those pointless football games are done with, and we can now focus on the one part of the NFL season that is actually interesting. It's time to start mindlessly flinging cash around for over-priced free agents, and speculating about college kids who will most likely end up disappointing us. It's the most wonderful time...oh, it's the most wonderful time...it's the most wonderful time of the year!
There seems to be a perpetual debate between some people's frenzy for quick free agent solutions, and the opposing crowd, that feels that teams need to build through the draft. While I love the draft, I really don't have a problem with signing free agents, as long as it is done rather cheaply. Free agency gets a bad rap because of legendarily stupid signings (Hello, Dan Snyder!) for high priced players, who often can't perform at the superhuman levels that would be required to justify their price tags. Still, there will be some players available at a halfway reasonable price, who I think might be able to outperform their contracts, or have small enough signing bonuses, so that potential 'dead money' hits should be of minimal concern even if they do end up as disappointments.
If there is one potential free agent who I am really salivating over, it would be the Raiders' left tackle Jared Veldheer. For some reason, a lot of sites seem to be ranking him below a number of other free agent tackles, that I find much less interesting, and I have to wonder how much of this is due to the low opinion that many people have of the Raiders. Personally, I think he is one of the top young OTs in the NFL, and has vast potential to get even better. Unfortunately, the Raiders are going to have so much cap space, it seems remarkably unlikely that they will ever let him go. Even if he was available, I have to suspect that he will end up getting an obscene contract that would be out of the Ravens' price range.
It's possible that I shouldn't put right tackle Rodger Saffold on this list, since I'm not sure how cheap he would be to sign, but as long as the Ravens are contemplating re-signing Eugene Monroe, I feel I should point to someone who I think is potentially a bit better. While Saffold has moved around from LT to RT to G, then briefly back to LT, I think he could probably play any position on the line better than any current Ravens' player, with the possible exception of Marshal Yanda. Still, I think this same versatility might hurt him in negotiating a new contract, as people might be unclear as to what position to play him at. I wouldn't be surprised if he signs a contract in the area of $4-5 million/ year, which I suspect will be less that what Monroe will cost. His value here is also being driven down by the number of games he has missed due to injury in the last few years (17 games missed in last 3 years). In the last 4 years Saffold has averaged 0.363 sacks allowed per game started, compared to Monroe's 0.440. The differences in where they line up really doesn't entirely justify these differences either, as the average number of sacks surrendered by right tackles, is virtually the same as the number given up by left tackles. In his last two seasons, however, Saffold has only allowed 0.113 sacks per game started, which is excellent. In the same 2 year time span, Monroe was at 0.338 sacks per game started. Saffold's athletic measurables also suggest a higher likelihood of maintaining/improving his current level of play, with a 0.918 Kangaroo Score, and a 0.819 Agility Score, compared to Monroe's more pedestrian 0.340 Kangaroo Score and -0.253 Agility Score. If the Ravens are going to insist on throwing money at a tackle, I would prefer that Saffold be the recipient since I think he is the most likely to continue to improve.
If there is one area in which the Cardinals do fairly well, it is in their drafting of wide receivers. So, why not poach Andre Roberts? For the last 4 years he has been an emerging talent, who only started to stumble a bit statistically in 2013, with Michael Floyd taking more of the targets in the passing game, while Roberts served as the third receiver. I still think there's a lot of upside here, and the computer considered him one of the top 5 receiver prospects in the 2010 draft. We can't change our minds now, can we? He's never going to be Calvin Johnson, but serving as a smaller secondary target, he could bring something different to the Ravens' offense. He'll be 26 at the start of the 2014 season, and I don't expect anyone to offer more than $3 million/year for his services, so it would be a rather low risk acquisition that might have some serious upside.
I have no idea what Chiefs' guard, Jon Asamoah, is going to attract as far as contract offers are concerned, but for the right price I would be interested. In the last 3 years his number of sacks allowed per game started has steadily improved, and he doesn't seem to commit many penalties. His combine measurables are in line with what we would hope to see for a guard, with a very average Kangaroo Score of -0.062, and an excellent Agility Score of 0.963. This just helps to calm any concerns I might have of how his skills would translate to a different team. In the last three years, Asamoah has allowed 0.162 sacks per game started, which is a better than average result. Honestly, I think Asamoah will end up getting offered significantly more than I would be willing to spend, as I would probably draw the line at $4 million/year. Still, a team might as well bid up his price, even if they can't acquire him, just to screw with an opponent's salary cap..
This particular player is no longer relevant, except for offering some perspective on where my thinking was directed prior to January 10th. Just to have as many offensive linemen options as possible I'd take a look at Bears's guard Matt Slauson. This 2009 6th round draft pick had a 1.337 Kangaroo Score, and a -0.425 Agility Score, which is somewhat peculiar, since guards don't tend to have these kinds of exceptional Kangaroo Scores. It might seem pointless to continue focusing on a player's combine measurables, even after they are supposedly known quantities as NFL players, but I think it helps to explain why a player is doing well, and gives a higher likelihood of their performance carrying over to a new team. In the last 3 years, Slauson's results in terms of sacks allowed per game started, have ranged from the exceptional (0 allowed in 2012) to the slightly above average (0.156 allowed/GS in 2011 and 2013). The Ravens may not think that a guard should be a priority, but at this point I would take any offensive linemen with decent potential. I would throw out similar offers to Slauson and Asamoah, and just see who was willing to sign for the least. Re-signed with Bears for average of $3.2 million/year. So, I would applaud that contract.
Unless the Bengals assign a 1st or 2nd round free agent tender to RFA linebacker Vincent Rey (there's a strong possibility they will do just that), a team could attempt to sign him without losing any draft picks. More than would probably make sense to most people, I would really like to see another team acquire Rey, because I find his potential to be incredibly intriguing, and would prefer that he isn't wasted on the bench. In 2013, Rey had 57 tackles, 4 sacks, 5 passes defended, and 2 interceptions, despite only starting in 3 games. While he went undrafted in 2010, the computer felt this was a mistake, and that his physical traits and statistical production in college suggested he was a more valuable draft prospect. He'll only be 27 years old at the start of the 2014 season, and seems to be a fairly versatile player. Even with his recent strong performances, I think teams are likely to undervalue him, since doing the opposite would mean acknowledging the possibility that they misjudged him back in 2010. Teams will probably want to see another year's worth of performance before changing their minds about Rey. I would try to swoop in now with a an offer of up to $2 million/year. If I had to bet, I think a team wouldn't even need to go that high with their offer. This might seem overly generous for a somewhat unproven player, but I don't think there is much risk in it. This would lock him up through the prime years of his career, and the signing bonus could probably be fairly minimal. This is a slight gamble, but if he continues to perform the way he did in limited playing time, which I believe he could, his price could skyrocket. If you're not willing to occasionally gamble on a hunch like this, then you are stuck paying exorbitant prices for more 'proven' players. Sadly, I think the Bengals will assign a 1st or 2nd round tender here, and Rey will squander most of the 2014 season on the bench..
I'm not quite sure what the Ravens are going to do about resigning Daryl Smith, but I would keep Chargers' linebacker Donald Butler on the radar as an option. Butler has the advantage of only being 26 years old at the start of the 2014 season, but has missed some games the last two years with injuries. It all comes down to who would take the least amount of money. I still prefer Vincent Rey over either of these other two options, since I think he will be the cheapest to sign, with the greatest likelihood of outperforming his contract. Most likely, Butler won't sign as cheaply as the aging Smith or the peculiar Rey, but you're better off having additional people to negotiate with.
While I would love to see Hakeem Nicks or Jeremy Maclin wind up in Baltimore, I don't see how the team will be able to afford either one of them, even with their injury histories suppressing their price tag. So, instead I will turn my eye to Kenny Britt. Yes, he may be a moron off of the field, but he was one of the computer's favorite receivers in the 2009 draft, and I think has actually done reasonably well when he isn't being suspended or getting benched for being an idiot. He's averaged almost 43 yards per game played, throughout his career, which is slightly above average, and this would work out to 688 yards in a 16 game season. Obviously, I'm mainly interested because I think he can be had dirt cheap, and if he screws up, you can just cut him.
Now, I'll toss in a couple of players who I think will be truly dirt cheap. These players would only be intended to provide depth, with the possibility that they might still have some untapped upside.
Louis Nzegwu is a bit of an oddball. Since he only averaged 7.25 tackles for a loss in his final two years at Wisconsin, we only viewed him as a late round prospect in the 2012 Draft, but one with intriguing physical potential. His 1.575 Kangaroo Score along with a 0.856 Agility Score are exceptional results for a 6'4" 252# player. In two 2013 preseason games, he accumulated 3 sacks, which were the first glimpses we saw of his pass rushing potential in action. Nobody seems to be interested in developing him as a player, and he should cost nothing. At one point in time NFL teams felt the same way about Cameron Wake, who similarly had shown little as a pass rusher in college, but also possessed physical traits that suggested he was worth keeping an eye on. Who knows whether history could repeat itself here? Ideally we would like to see him tried as a 3-4 OLB.
I have had a strange fascination with outside linebacker Frank Zombo for the past couple years, and it isn't just because of his brilliant website. I have rarely gotten to see him play, since he has almost always been used as just a backup, but his 0.483 Kangaroo Score and 0.358 Agility Score suggest he has pretty good physical potential. I'm not saying that there is anything mind-blowing about those results, but they are respectable. That combined with his 12.75 Avg TFLs in college would have made him a late 6th to early 7th round prospect for us, though he obviously went undrafted. He will be 27 at the start of the 2014 season, and whether there is any real upside to him is debatable, but he should at the very least provide good depth. In limited playing time, he has managed to show some flashes as a pass rusher, with 7 career sacks, despite only starting in 14 games. Considering he was only paid $640k in 2013, and people probably haven't changed their views on him to drastically, I would doubt that there will be much of a spending frenzy here. He strikes me as a nice and cheap acquisition to provide depth.
Since he has almost never gotten any real opportunity to play, Bengals cornerback Brandon Ghee probably won't get much attention in free agency. Going back to the 2010 Draft, he is listed as a 5' 11" and 192 pound corner, who ran a 4.37 40-yard dash (with a 0.15 2nd Gear Score). He also had a 0.737 Agility Score. So, he is an average sized corner with excellent speed, and pretty good agility. The problem, from the computer's perspective, was that he didn't get his hands on the ball very much while playing at Wake Forest, with only 1 interception throughout his college career, and only about 8 passes defended per year. Still, I think he has the athletic ability to at the very least compete for a 3rd or 4th cornerback spot, and will only be 27 years old at the start of the 2014 season.
I think it is probably fair to say that Buccaneers' DE/OLB Daniel Te'o-Nesheim hasn't set the world on fire with his play. The question for me is whether he would do better in a 3-4 defense. As a draft prospect, in 2010, he was intriguing to us because of his impressive athletic ability (1.071 Kangaroo Score, and a 1.109 Agility Score). Unfortunately, or perhaps not, the 12.75 TFLs that he averaged in his last two years in college, meant that he only merited a 4th round grade according to our system, while the Eagles selected him in the 3rd round. It is entirely possible that he will never live up to his physical potential, but before we give up on him completely, I'd be curious to see what he can do in a 3-4. Perhaps getting off of the line, and using his abilities in space, would resuscitate his career. He will be 27 years old at the start of the 2014 season. Either way, it wouldn't cost much to find out, probably near the veteran minimum $730k.
For a truly weird acquisition, I think it would also be interesting to take a look at Wade Jacobson, who is currently an offensive tackle for....hmmm....nobody. Athletically, this 2013 prospect from Washington State, is a marvel. His 1.788 Kangaroo Score, and 1.407 Agility Score, are just shocking and actually surpass Lane Johnson's numbers. Still, he went undrafted, and only stuck around for a brief time in the Redskins' training camp last year. If I thought that NFL teams knew what they were doing I would be more concerned about this, but I don't see any reason to take his dismissal too seriously. He did have some problems with a back injury in college, and I have no idea if that is a lingering issue. It is entirely possible that there are issues here that I am unaware of, but his physical potential seems to be pretty remarkable, and since he would cost nothing to bring into a training camp, I would give him a shot. Players with this kind of physical ability generally don't fail, so I would love to see if there is some potential here.
Finally, I have some minor interest in another Buccaneers' scrub, linebacker Dekoda Watson. In many was he is a shrunken down clone of the previously mentioned Daniel Te'o-Nesheim, with a 1.075 Kangaroo Score, and a 1.014 Agility Score, but he only weighs about 240 pounds. At this weight, he would probably be limited to providing depth at the ILB position for the Ravens. He will be 26 years old at the start of the 2014 season, and I would be willing to pay him 2, or perhaps 3, ham sandwiches for his services. This would purely be a salvage project.
Perhaps the most exciting move this off-season will be the eventual departure of Terrence "Mole-hill" Cody. There is definitely something to be said for addition by subtraction in this case, and Cody's departure would allow Brandon Williams (who I like as a prospect) to get more playing time.
Monday, January 20, 2014
Sunday, January 5, 2014
The Price For A Left Tackle
Do you remember when the Ravens dumped obscene amounts of cash on Joe Flacco's head, largely because of a post-season run that was far above his usual level of play? The thinking, at the time, seemed to be 'you can't win without a top QB, so you have to pay him'. The possibility of drawing a line, above which the team would not go, as far as salary, was apparently unthinkable. Well, they seem to be ready to take a similar, if slightly less insane, approach towards resigning Eugene Monroe, and I'm really not sure if this is going to turn out to be a much better decision (it isn't that I don't respect Flacco, but rather just my discomfort with the contract he received, and the long term consequences of it).
To start things off, let's take a look at the average yearly salaries of all NFL left tackles, who are starters, excluding players who are operating under rookie contracts.
Starting with the average salary of $7.828 million dollars per year, we probably need to make a couple of corrections to get a better idea of what the likely starting point for negotiations will be. First of all, Bryant McKinnie is operating under an 'acquired from the scrap heap' type of contract. Joe Staley, on the other hand, has performed quite well, but is working under a contract extension he signed in 2009, before the start of his third NFL season, and is obviously playing for well below his market value. If both of these contracts were removed from our calculation, the average salary for a veteran starting left tackle would jump to $8.386 million per year. Of course, a number of these other players signed their contracts several years ago, so this also doesn't reflect the annual inflation that you tend to see with new contracts, where everybody expects to be paid more than the last guy who signed an extension, regardless of whether they are actually any better than anybody else at their position.
There seems to be a lot of speculation amongst Ravens' fans, that Eugene Monroe will give the team a break on his salary demands, and settle for something in the $6.5 million range. Most of this idle chatter seems to revolve around some assumed gratitude he would feel for being freed from the Jaguars' franchise. Such ideas strike me as a bit goofy, but feel free to run with that if you wish to. It's certainly possible that he could sign a reasonably priced contract, but he does have the Ravens somewhat over a barrel since they are probably a bit desperate right now to fill one of their tackle slots. Of course, if he didn't choose to be so generous, the team could consider using the franchise tag on him, which for offensive linemen in 2014 is projected to be $11.126 million. Considering that the Ravens are only expected to have about $13.9 million in cap space (with only 37 players under contract) that wouldn't appear to be a reasonable option. So, in the end, I suspect the Ravens will end up offering him $7.5 - 8.5 million per year, which is basically in line with the average salary for his peers.
What about all of the other left tackles, who are currently playing under rookie contracts? Well, their average yearly salary would be about $2.997 million per year, though a number of these contracts were drawn up before the newest CBA agreement with the Player's Association, which significantly reduced the cost of rookie contracts. With the Ravens drafting at either the 16th or 17th slot in the 2014 Draft, an offensive lineman would probably cost them about $2.1 million per year, if selected in the first round, based on last years rookie contracts.
What Monroe probably deserves to be paid, is a very different question. So, let's examine this in bite sized pieces of highly dubious analysis.
First of all, as far as I can tell, the average starting left tackle will give up about 0.4 sacks per game started. An exceptional year for a left tackle would be a result of around 0.2 sacks per games started, while a result of 0.6 sack per game started might spell the end of your career as a starter. For the 2013 season, the average result seemed to dip slightly lower, to around 0.420 sacks per game started (based on data from STATS.COM), and a median result of 0.403 sacks per game started. So, 2013 was a fairly typical year, as far as these averages go. My data for this only goes back about five years, so I might reevaluate all of this at a later time.
Of course, every player has their good years and their bad years. To some extent, you have to make allowances for some of the player's surrounding talent, injuries, and the type of QB they are protecting. Nonetheless, I will say that Eugene Monroe allowed precisely 0.433 sacks per game started in 2014, an incredibly average result. If someone wants to point to issues that excuse this average result, that is fine. There is a lot of room to debate these numbers. My only concern here is that this has been a fairly good year by Monroe's standards, since he has typically averaged 0.479 sacks per game started over the prior 4 seasons, with only his 2012 result of 0.250 being a significant positive deviation from his career averages. I also have to wonder if his 2013 results might actually be skewed in his favor, due to the failures of the other players on the line. After all, you can only give up one sack on a given play, and Michael Oher and Gino Gradkowski seemed to be competing for that honor. You don't need to be great, you just need to hold your block longer than the guys who are next to you, in order to look good by comparison.
Since at lot of my hunches about draft prospects are strongly based on how they did at the combine, I will say that these are the kinds of results we were sort of expecting for Monroe. As I said a few months ago, in this post, his measurable data suggested that he was just an average to slightly above average prospect. I'm not trying to suggest that he can't exceed my expectations, merely that he so far hasn't done much to do so. So, to some extent, I would be concerned about him maintaining a rather flat trajectory when it comes to his potential for improvement. After five years, I would have hoped to see steadier and more significant progress, if I was going to throw large amounts of money at him.
To some extent, I think the interest in resigning Monroe relates to three matters of bias and perception. First, is the idea that he may have been the best offensive lineman for the Ravens this year, which is possibly true. This still doesn't necessarily make him a great talent, as it seems just as plausible to me that the rest of the line was garbage. Secondly, there is the sense of relief at having someone replace Bryant McKinnie, who appeared to be more interested in chasing strippers than in his blocking duties. Who am I to judge Bryant for this? They are called gentleman's clubs for a reason, so I have to assume that Bryant is a classy guy. Thirdly, I think players like Monroe continue to get the benefit of the doubt because of their status as former 1st round picks. However you look at these issues, is your own business. Instead, let's just look at the impact that he had on different aspects of the offense this year.
In the passing game:
As I mentioned a while back, Flacco has generally gotten sacked at a pretty steady rate throughout his career, generally around once every 13-17 pass attempts, which is a rather poor to average result. Clearly, 2013 was a particularly rough year for Flacco, but the odd thing is he was actually getting sacked more frequently after the switch to Monroe in week 6. His yards per pass attempt also fell slightly, as you would expect of someone under increased pressure to get rid of the ball quickly. On the other hand, his passer rating did go up slightly. Some people might point to the loss of guard Kelechi Osemele, who was lost after week 7, as a contributing factor but I can't really see much reason to justify that argument. Digging into the question of whether Osemele really presents a strong reason to be optimistic about the future, would be opening a whole other can of worms, though I'm probably not as enthusiastic about his future as many Ravens' fans are. However you look at this, it is hard to argue that there was a significant statistical improvement from week 6 to the end of the season.
In the running game:
These numbers for the Ravens' running game are only the combined results of Ray Rice and Bernard Pierce's rushing attempts, as I thought throwing in the odd scrambles by QB Tyrod Taylor, or whomever else, weren't too useful, and might add confusion. While the average rushing attempt did go for a slightly longer gain (0.138 yards further, or 4.968 inches to make this look even more depressing) when Monroe took over, the end result really wasn't much different. The additional fact that the Ravens only scored one rushing touchdown (excluding one Flacco rushing TD) in the last 11 games, should also be seen as a bit horrifying.
I wouldn't say that any of the Ravens' struggles were really Monroe's fault. All I can say is that from the time he arrived, I haven't really seen any significant improvement, statistical or otherwise, from the team. You would tend to think that a player who is poised to potentially get payed a significant amount of money would have had some measurable impact. I realize that people could point to the rest of the o-line, as being the true culprits for the team's failures, but why would you pay one player while admitting that they will probably accomplish very little unless the other players are upgraded too? Monroe may very well be a capable left tackle, but exceptional? I'm not so sure about that. I'm even less sure that a cap strapped team like the Ravens should be tying up significant amounts of their payroll on someone who appears the be at best decent or average, when they could probably get someone of comparable ability for between a quarter to a third of the cost in the draft, or through clever exploration of the bowels of free agency. Of course, that depends on how confident you are in the Ravens' approach to drafting offensive linemen, a subject about which I have some additional concerns.
In the end, I think Monroe is possibly worth about $4-5 million/year, but this doesn't fit within the structure of contemporary NFL contracts, where at least one team can always be counted on to overspend based on their feelings of desperation. An offer such as the one I have proposed would almost certainly be laughed at by Monroe's agent, and justifiably so. I am certain that some team will pay Monroe significantly more than what I have suggested. Still, that is where I would probably draw the line, and if he winds up somewhere else, I would content myself with the inevitable 3rd or 4th round compensatory pick that the team would likely receive for his loss. Personally, I think a player should only be signed to a contract that they are likely to outperform, but this clearly isn't a popular view. For now, we'll just have to wait and see how this all plays out.
To start things off, let's take a look at the average yearly salaries of all NFL left tackles, who are starters, excluding players who are operating under rookie contracts.
| Player | Team | Salary (in millions) |
| Ryan Clady | Broncos | 10.5 |
| Jason Peters | Eagles | 10.1 |
| Joe Thomas | Browns | 10.06 |
| Brandon Albert | Chiefs | 9.82 |
| Jordan Gross | Panthers | 9.4 |
| D'Brickashaw Ferguson | Jets | 9.2 |
| Jake Long | Rams | 8.5 |
| Duane Brown | Texans | 8.028 |
| William Beatty | Giants | 7.5 |
| Jermon Bushrod | Bears | 7.193 |
| Michael Roos | Titans | 7.166 |
| Donald Penn | Buccaneers | 6.95 |
| Sam Baker | Falcons | 6.8 |
| Andrew Whitworth | Bengals | 6.2 |
| Joe Staley | 49ers | 4.686 |
| Bryant McKinnie | Dolphins | 3.15 |
| AVG | 7.828 |
Starting with the average salary of $7.828 million dollars per year, we probably need to make a couple of corrections to get a better idea of what the likely starting point for negotiations will be. First of all, Bryant McKinnie is operating under an 'acquired from the scrap heap' type of contract. Joe Staley, on the other hand, has performed quite well, but is working under a contract extension he signed in 2009, before the start of his third NFL season, and is obviously playing for well below his market value. If both of these contracts were removed from our calculation, the average salary for a veteran starting left tackle would jump to $8.386 million per year. Of course, a number of these other players signed their contracts several years ago, so this also doesn't reflect the annual inflation that you tend to see with new contracts, where everybody expects to be paid more than the last guy who signed an extension, regardless of whether they are actually any better than anybody else at their position.
There seems to be a lot of speculation amongst Ravens' fans, that Eugene Monroe will give the team a break on his salary demands, and settle for something in the $6.5 million range. Most of this idle chatter seems to revolve around some assumed gratitude he would feel for being freed from the Jaguars' franchise. Such ideas strike me as a bit goofy, but feel free to run with that if you wish to. It's certainly possible that he could sign a reasonably priced contract, but he does have the Ravens somewhat over a barrel since they are probably a bit desperate right now to fill one of their tackle slots. Of course, if he didn't choose to be so generous, the team could consider using the franchise tag on him, which for offensive linemen in 2014 is projected to be $11.126 million. Considering that the Ravens are only expected to have about $13.9 million in cap space (with only 37 players under contract) that wouldn't appear to be a reasonable option. So, in the end, I suspect the Ravens will end up offering him $7.5 - 8.5 million per year, which is basically in line with the average salary for his peers.
What about all of the other left tackles, who are currently playing under rookie contracts? Well, their average yearly salary would be about $2.997 million per year, though a number of these contracts were drawn up before the newest CBA agreement with the Player's Association, which significantly reduced the cost of rookie contracts. With the Ravens drafting at either the 16th or 17th slot in the 2014 Draft, an offensive lineman would probably cost them about $2.1 million per year, if selected in the first round, based on last years rookie contracts.
What Monroe probably deserves to be paid, is a very different question. So, let's examine this in bite sized pieces of highly dubious analysis.
First of all, as far as I can tell, the average starting left tackle will give up about 0.4 sacks per game started. An exceptional year for a left tackle would be a result of around 0.2 sacks per games started, while a result of 0.6 sack per game started might spell the end of your career as a starter. For the 2013 season, the average result seemed to dip slightly lower, to around 0.420 sacks per game started (based on data from STATS.COM), and a median result of 0.403 sacks per game started. So, 2013 was a fairly typical year, as far as these averages go. My data for this only goes back about five years, so I might reevaluate all of this at a later time.
Of course, every player has their good years and their bad years. To some extent, you have to make allowances for some of the player's surrounding talent, injuries, and the type of QB they are protecting. Nonetheless, I will say that Eugene Monroe allowed precisely 0.433 sacks per game started in 2014, an incredibly average result. If someone wants to point to issues that excuse this average result, that is fine. There is a lot of room to debate these numbers. My only concern here is that this has been a fairly good year by Monroe's standards, since he has typically averaged 0.479 sacks per game started over the prior 4 seasons, with only his 2012 result of 0.250 being a significant positive deviation from his career averages. I also have to wonder if his 2013 results might actually be skewed in his favor, due to the failures of the other players on the line. After all, you can only give up one sack on a given play, and Michael Oher and Gino Gradkowski seemed to be competing for that honor. You don't need to be great, you just need to hold your block longer than the guys who are next to you, in order to look good by comparison.
Since at lot of my hunches about draft prospects are strongly based on how they did at the combine, I will say that these are the kinds of results we were sort of expecting for Monroe. As I said a few months ago, in this post, his measurable data suggested that he was just an average to slightly above average prospect. I'm not trying to suggest that he can't exceed my expectations, merely that he so far hasn't done much to do so. So, to some extent, I would be concerned about him maintaining a rather flat trajectory when it comes to his potential for improvement. After five years, I would have hoped to see steadier and more significant progress, if I was going to throw large amounts of money at him.
To some extent, I think the interest in resigning Monroe relates to three matters of bias and perception. First, is the idea that he may have been the best offensive lineman for the Ravens this year, which is possibly true. This still doesn't necessarily make him a great talent, as it seems just as plausible to me that the rest of the line was garbage. Secondly, there is the sense of relief at having someone replace Bryant McKinnie, who appeared to be more interested in chasing strippers than in his blocking duties. Who am I to judge Bryant for this? They are called gentleman's clubs for a reason, so I have to assume that Bryant is a classy guy. Thirdly, I think players like Monroe continue to get the benefit of the doubt because of their status as former 1st round picks. However you look at these issues, is your own business. Instead, let's just look at the impact that he had on different aspects of the offense this year.
In the passing game:
| Weeks | Pass Att/Sacks | YPA | Pass Rat. | |
| With McKinnie | 1 to 5 | 14.35 | 6.76 | 70.07 |
| With Monroe | 6 to 17 | 12.14 | 6.17 | 74.64 |
As I mentioned a while back, Flacco has generally gotten sacked at a pretty steady rate throughout his career, generally around once every 13-17 pass attempts, which is a rather poor to average result. Clearly, 2013 was a particularly rough year for Flacco, but the odd thing is he was actually getting sacked more frequently after the switch to Monroe in week 6. His yards per pass attempt also fell slightly, as you would expect of someone under increased pressure to get rid of the ball quickly. On the other hand, his passer rating did go up slightly. Some people might point to the loss of guard Kelechi Osemele, who was lost after week 7, as a contributing factor but I can't really see much reason to justify that argument. Digging into the question of whether Osemele really presents a strong reason to be optimistic about the future, would be opening a whole other can of worms, though I'm probably not as enthusiastic about his future as many Ravens' fans are. However you look at this, it is hard to argue that there was a significant statistical improvement from week 6 to the end of the season.
In the running game:
| Yards | Att. | Avg. | TDs | |
| Total | 1096 | 366 | 2.994 | 6 |
| With McKinnie | 360 | 124 | 2.903 | 5 |
| With Monroe | 736 | 242 | 3.041 | 1 |
These numbers for the Ravens' running game are only the combined results of Ray Rice and Bernard Pierce's rushing attempts, as I thought throwing in the odd scrambles by QB Tyrod Taylor, or whomever else, weren't too useful, and might add confusion. While the average rushing attempt did go for a slightly longer gain (0.138 yards further, or 4.968 inches to make this look even more depressing) when Monroe took over, the end result really wasn't much different. The additional fact that the Ravens only scored one rushing touchdown (excluding one Flacco rushing TD) in the last 11 games, should also be seen as a bit horrifying.
I wouldn't say that any of the Ravens' struggles were really Monroe's fault. All I can say is that from the time he arrived, I haven't really seen any significant improvement, statistical or otherwise, from the team. You would tend to think that a player who is poised to potentially get payed a significant amount of money would have had some measurable impact. I realize that people could point to the rest of the o-line, as being the true culprits for the team's failures, but why would you pay one player while admitting that they will probably accomplish very little unless the other players are upgraded too? Monroe may very well be a capable left tackle, but exceptional? I'm not so sure about that. I'm even less sure that a cap strapped team like the Ravens should be tying up significant amounts of their payroll on someone who appears the be at best decent or average, when they could probably get someone of comparable ability for between a quarter to a third of the cost in the draft, or through clever exploration of the bowels of free agency. Of course, that depends on how confident you are in the Ravens' approach to drafting offensive linemen, a subject about which I have some additional concerns.
In the end, I think Monroe is possibly worth about $4-5 million/year, but this doesn't fit within the structure of contemporary NFL contracts, where at least one team can always be counted on to overspend based on their feelings of desperation. An offer such as the one I have proposed would almost certainly be laughed at by Monroe's agent, and justifiably so. I am certain that some team will pay Monroe significantly more than what I have suggested. Still, that is where I would probably draw the line, and if he winds up somewhere else, I would content myself with the inevitable 3rd or 4th round compensatory pick that the team would likely receive for his loss. Personally, I think a player should only be signed to a contract that they are likely to outperform, but this clearly isn't a popular view. For now, we'll just have to wait and see how this all plays out.
Sunday, December 29, 2013
A Pair of Pass Rushers: Hughes & Worilds
Sometimes the decisions that teams make really baffle me. One the
one hand, you know that NFL GMs covet quality pass rushers. On the
other hand, they often seem perfectly willing to screw over their players, and
not give them a chance to succeed. Maybe that comes across as a little
harsh, but let's take a look at some of the odd decisions that they
made this year, related to Jason Worilds and Jerry Hughes.
First off, we'll poke around the Jerry Hughes situation. Despite being a former first round pick (31st overall selection in 2010), he was constantly buried behind Robert Mathis and Dwight Freeney on the Colts' depth chart, starting only 7 games in his first 3 years. You would think that failing to take a starting job from either of those two players would be understandable, but the fans seemed to eventually turn to the "he can't get on the field, so he must be a bust" viewpoint. The Colts' management evidently were of the same mindset as the fans, as they drafted Bjoern Werner in the first round (24th pick overall in 2013), to provide a pass rushing presence that Hughes apparently wasn't capable of while sitting on the bench. With renewed confidence that they had gotten it right this time, the Colts promptly traded the nearly showroom condition Jerry Hughes to Buffalo, for middling linebacker Kelvin Sheppard.
What was the outcome of this trade? Well, let's look at their statistical performances in 2013.
It appears that when finally given a real opportunity, Jerry Hughes did turn into a legitimate pass rusher. His replacement in Indianapolis, on the other hand, has struggled mightily. Now, I'm sure that some people will argue that Werner is just a rookie, and that he should be given time to prove himself, the same sort of time that I might criticize the organization for not giving to Jerry Hughes. The difference here is that Werner's measurables don't give me much confidence that he will ever really develop into anything special, while Hughes at least gave us some reason to be optimistic.
So, let's look at their data from the combine, side by side.
The Kangaroo Score (my measure of lower body power) and Agility Score (based on the short shuttle and 3-Cone drill), are given in the form of how many standard deviations away from the average result for their peers, that a player is. As I explained in the post on Explosive Pass Rushers, I basically use the player's Final Score, in combination with a player's Avg. TFL (the average number of tackles for a loss that a player had in his last two years in college) is used to come up with a rough idea as to what round I would be willing to draft a player in. According to these numbers, Jerry Hughes would have been considered a 3rd round prospect by the computer (admittedly lower than where he was selected, but still intriguing to us). Technically, Hughes is a player who would better fit in the High Agility Pass Rusher category, for obvious reasons, though this doesn't alter the round in which the computer would have selected him. Werner, despite a respectable number of tackles for a loss in his college years, would have been viewed as too risky a prospect for me to select in any round (though a very late round pick could be considered, I suppose), due to his poor physical measurables. You can take this all with an enormous grain of salt, as it is just my goofy method for judging things, but it tends to produce reasonable results.
One of the more peculiar aspects of this, is in how these players are utilized. Being a somewhat smaller to average sized DE/OLB prospect, at 254 pounds, Hughes, with his excellent agility measurements would have seemed to perhaps be better suited for a 3-4 defense, where he could operate in space and not get smothered by larger offensive tackles. Of course, the Colts were running a 4-3 defense during the majority of the time he was with them, until 2012 when they switched to a 3-4, and suddenly Hughes responded with 4 sacks in 6 games started. Then, to make matters even stranger, they draft Werner, a somewhat larger 266 pound player with below average/poor measurables in terms of agility and speed, and ask him to operate in space, something he may not be terribly well suited for athletically. Hello there, square peg and round hole, I'd like to introduce you to Chuck Pagano's mighty mallet of misguided machinations, which will make everything turn out just fine. It almost feels as if teams select their defensive scheme, with little to no thought as to whether it suits a player's abilities.
Now let's move on to the Steelers' situation with Jason Worilds. Similar to Jerry Hughes, Worilds was stuck behind James Harrison and LaMarr Woodley, a rather successful and talented pass rushing duo. After three years of just occasional usage in a rotation, it seems that the Steelers' expectations had diminished for this former 2nd round pick. With the departure of James Harrison, the organization decided to fill this void by selecting Jarvis Jones in the first round (17th pick overall), in the 2013 Draft. While Jones was given the starting job at the opening of the season, his lack of production eventually resulted in Worilds being given his first real opportunity to prove himself. Let's take a look at their results in 2013, to see how they did.
Again, I suspect a lot of people will argue that Jarvis Jones just needs time to develop, but I'm just not terribly confident he will ever really turn into the sort of player the Steelers are probably looking for. The positive side of this, is that the Steelers could still choose to bring Worilds back next year (he will be a free agent after the 2013 season), though this might require admitting to some problems with Jones. Teams do seem to have a problem with admitting to potential mistakes with their draft picks, so this will be interesting to watch. Still, just like we did with Hughes and Werner, let's take a look at how the computer viewed them as draft prospects, to see if either one has an advantage over the other, or might be a better long term gamble.
In this case, the computer feels that the Steelers hit the nail on the head with their selection of Jason Worilds, and assigned him a 2nd round grade, which is precisely where he was taken. Jarvis Jones, on the other hand, produced nightmarishly poor results at the combine, that largely negated any good will his excellent college production might have engendered. I honestly have to wonder if Jarvis Jones was drunk at the combine, to produce these kinds of numbers. While it is certainly possible for a player with poor physical measurables to become a quality player, it isn't the sort of thing that happens frequently enough to take this sort of gamble in this first round. When you throw in Jones' health concerns (spinal stenosis), it makes his selection in the 1st round even more perplexing.
When you see that the computer only rated Worilds and Hughes as 2nd and 3rd round draft prospects, it might seem odd that I am so interested in how they perform. The truth is, that despite these modest appraisals, they were still the computer's second and third rated pass rushing prospects in 2010 (out of 57 players, between 240-280 pounds, who we felt might be used in a pass rushing role), and rated well ahead of players like Brandon Graham, Jason Piere-Paul, and Derrick Morgan (who were selected with the 13th, 15th, and 16th overall picks). Graham has clearly been a disappointment for the Eagles. Morgan appears to have done somewhat better, though almost certainly not at the level you would hope for from a 1st round pick. Pierre-Paul is a bit of an enigma, who had one huge season, then started to turn into a pumpkin again (though injuries may be a factor). So, it is nice to finally see Worilds and Hughes beginning to justify the computer's optimism. We were getting tired of waiting.
In the end, none of this should be taken as a statement of my strong belief in Hughes or Worilds. I think they are legitimate pass rushing prospects, now somewhat confirmed, though a long way from greatness. Their physical measurables and college production suggested they had potential, though they certainly wouldn't rank as highly as many other prospects in better draft classes, whom the computer might feel more strongly about. Still, like I said, they seemed to have a reasonable likelihood of doing okay for themselves, which is more than I can say for the people that teams have tried to shove onto the field as their replacements. That, right there, is the issue that confuses and annoys me. Just having to ask the question of whether the best players are even getting on the field, is something that should be unthinkable.
First off, we'll poke around the Jerry Hughes situation. Despite being a former first round pick (31st overall selection in 2010), he was constantly buried behind Robert Mathis and Dwight Freeney on the Colts' depth chart, starting only 7 games in his first 3 years. You would think that failing to take a starting job from either of those two players would be understandable, but the fans seemed to eventually turn to the "he can't get on the field, so he must be a bust" viewpoint. The Colts' management evidently were of the same mindset as the fans, as they drafted Bjoern Werner in the first round (24th pick overall in 2013), to provide a pass rushing presence that Hughes apparently wasn't capable of while sitting on the bench. With renewed confidence that they had gotten it right this time, the Colts promptly traded the nearly showroom condition Jerry Hughes to Buffalo, for middling linebacker Kelvin Sheppard.
What was the outcome of this trade? Well, let's look at their statistical performances in 2013.
| GP | GS | Tackles | Sack | Pdef | FF | |
| Jerry Hughes | 16 | 1 | 46 | 10 | 2 | 2 |
| Bjoern Werner | 13 | 1 | 18 | 2.5 | 2 | 0 |
It appears that when finally given a real opportunity, Jerry Hughes did turn into a legitimate pass rusher. His replacement in Indianapolis, on the other hand, has struggled mightily. Now, I'm sure that some people will argue that Werner is just a rookie, and that he should be given time to prove himself, the same sort of time that I might criticize the organization for not giving to Jerry Hughes. The difference here is that Werner's measurables don't give me much confidence that he will ever really develop into anything special, while Hughes at least gave us some reason to be optimistic.
So, let's look at their data from the combine, side by side.
| Player | Year | Pick# | 40 Yard | KANG | Agility | FINAL | Avg. TFL |
| Jerry Hughes | 2010 | 31 | 4.65 | 0.155 | 1.038 | 0.448 | 18 |
| Bjoern Werner | 2013 | 24 | 4.83 | -0.280 | -0.251 | -0.220 | 14.5 |
The Kangaroo Score (my measure of lower body power) and Agility Score (based on the short shuttle and 3-Cone drill), are given in the form of how many standard deviations away from the average result for their peers, that a player is. As I explained in the post on Explosive Pass Rushers, I basically use the player's Final Score, in combination with a player's Avg. TFL (the average number of tackles for a loss that a player had in his last two years in college) is used to come up with a rough idea as to what round I would be willing to draft a player in. According to these numbers, Jerry Hughes would have been considered a 3rd round prospect by the computer (admittedly lower than where he was selected, but still intriguing to us). Technically, Hughes is a player who would better fit in the High Agility Pass Rusher category, for obvious reasons, though this doesn't alter the round in which the computer would have selected him. Werner, despite a respectable number of tackles for a loss in his college years, would have been viewed as too risky a prospect for me to select in any round (though a very late round pick could be considered, I suppose), due to his poor physical measurables. You can take this all with an enormous grain of salt, as it is just my goofy method for judging things, but it tends to produce reasonable results.
One of the more peculiar aspects of this, is in how these players are utilized. Being a somewhat smaller to average sized DE/OLB prospect, at 254 pounds, Hughes, with his excellent agility measurements would have seemed to perhaps be better suited for a 3-4 defense, where he could operate in space and not get smothered by larger offensive tackles. Of course, the Colts were running a 4-3 defense during the majority of the time he was with them, until 2012 when they switched to a 3-4, and suddenly Hughes responded with 4 sacks in 6 games started. Then, to make matters even stranger, they draft Werner, a somewhat larger 266 pound player with below average/poor measurables in terms of agility and speed, and ask him to operate in space, something he may not be terribly well suited for athletically. Hello there, square peg and round hole, I'd like to introduce you to Chuck Pagano's mighty mallet of misguided machinations, which will make everything turn out just fine. It almost feels as if teams select their defensive scheme, with little to no thought as to whether it suits a player's abilities.
Now let's move on to the Steelers' situation with Jason Worilds. Similar to Jerry Hughes, Worilds was stuck behind James Harrison and LaMarr Woodley, a rather successful and talented pass rushing duo. After three years of just occasional usage in a rotation, it seems that the Steelers' expectations had diminished for this former 2nd round pick. With the departure of James Harrison, the organization decided to fill this void by selecting Jarvis Jones in the first round (17th pick overall), in the 2013 Draft. While Jones was given the starting job at the opening of the season, his lack of production eventually resulted in Worilds being given his first real opportunity to prove himself. Let's take a look at their results in 2013, to see how they did.
| GP | GS | Tackles | Sack | Pdef | FF | |
| Jason Worilds | 15 | 11 | 63 | 8 | 2 | 2 |
| Jarvis Jones | 14 | 8 | 40 | 1 | 4 | 0 |
Again, I suspect a lot of people will argue that Jarvis Jones just needs time to develop, but I'm just not terribly confident he will ever really turn into the sort of player the Steelers are probably looking for. The positive side of this, is that the Steelers could still choose to bring Worilds back next year (he will be a free agent after the 2013 season), though this might require admitting to some problems with Jones. Teams do seem to have a problem with admitting to potential mistakes with their draft picks, so this will be interesting to watch. Still, just like we did with Hughes and Werner, let's take a look at how the computer viewed them as draft prospects, to see if either one has an advantage over the other, or might be a better long term gamble.
| Player | Year | Pick# | 40 Yard | KANG | Agility | FINAL | Avg. TFL |
| Jason Worilds | 2010 | 52 | 4.65 | 0.604 | 0.727 | 0.583 | 14.75 |
| Jarvis Jones | 2013 | 17 | 4.92 | -1.243 | -1.304 | -1.216 | 22 |
In this case, the computer feels that the Steelers hit the nail on the head with their selection of Jason Worilds, and assigned him a 2nd round grade, which is precisely where he was taken. Jarvis Jones, on the other hand, produced nightmarishly poor results at the combine, that largely negated any good will his excellent college production might have engendered. I honestly have to wonder if Jarvis Jones was drunk at the combine, to produce these kinds of numbers. While it is certainly possible for a player with poor physical measurables to become a quality player, it isn't the sort of thing that happens frequently enough to take this sort of gamble in this first round. When you throw in Jones' health concerns (spinal stenosis), it makes his selection in the 1st round even more perplexing.
When you see that the computer only rated Worilds and Hughes as 2nd and 3rd round draft prospects, it might seem odd that I am so interested in how they perform. The truth is, that despite these modest appraisals, they were still the computer's second and third rated pass rushing prospects in 2010 (out of 57 players, between 240-280 pounds, who we felt might be used in a pass rushing role), and rated well ahead of players like Brandon Graham, Jason Piere-Paul, and Derrick Morgan (who were selected with the 13th, 15th, and 16th overall picks). Graham has clearly been a disappointment for the Eagles. Morgan appears to have done somewhat better, though almost certainly not at the level you would hope for from a 1st round pick. Pierre-Paul is a bit of an enigma, who had one huge season, then started to turn into a pumpkin again (though injuries may be a factor). So, it is nice to finally see Worilds and Hughes beginning to justify the computer's optimism. We were getting tired of waiting.
In the end, none of this should be taken as a statement of my strong belief in Hughes or Worilds. I think they are legitimate pass rushing prospects, now somewhat confirmed, though a long way from greatness. Their physical measurables and college production suggested they had potential, though they certainly wouldn't rank as highly as many other prospects in better draft classes, whom the computer might feel more strongly about. Still, like I said, they seemed to have a reasonable likelihood of doing okay for themselves, which is more than I can say for the people that teams have tried to shove onto the field as their replacements. That, right there, is the issue that confuses and annoys me. Just having to ask the question of whether the best players are even getting on the field, is something that should be unthinkable.
Monday, December 9, 2013
Sometimes I'm Wrong...
Speculating about the future success of college football players is a questionable endeavor. Having your speculation based almost entirely off of the players' combine data and college stats is even more questionable. Sometimes I'll be right, and sometimes I'll be wrong.
Being wrong doesn't necessarily bother me too much, so long as it doesn't happen too frequently. My main goal is just to explore some ideas on how to optimize a team's chances of success in the NFL Draft, based on more objective data. I can't pretend to have watched the majority of the players when they were in college, and honestly doubt that doing so really is a very reliable method for identifying talent. For the most part, I'm just curious as to whether draft selections chosen by a computer can approach or exceed the results made by NFL GMs. If, indeed they are experts in this field, I should fail horribly. If the GMs are blindly guessing, while posturing as highly paid experts, maybe the results will be surprising. Personally, I suspect that the average fan with a draft magazine and a dart board, could probably do just as well as the best experts, so I aim to encourage a bit of doubt when it comes to blindly trusting the people in charge.
While I have plenty of stupid ideas, the real core of my idiocy probably gets condensed down to my annual Ozzie Newsome Challenge. While teams talk about taking the "best player available", I think it can generally be agreed that all such claims are blatantly bullsh*t. Frequently this familiar line gets modified to "best player available at a position of need", which is more honest, though probably still a bit misguided. It's kind of like going to a party, in search of your future wife/sandwich maker, and saying that you are seeking the "best wife available....with exceptionally large breasts". The added qualifier "with exceptionally large breasts" sort of reveals what your real motives are. For instance, do you really think that Matt Elam and Arthur Brown (the Ravens' first 2 selections in the 2013 Draft), were the best players available? Or, were the Ravens blatantly trying to fill holes left by the departure of Ed Reed and Ray Lewis? In the Ozzie Newsome Challenge, we admittedly don't exactly go for best player available either. Instead, we try to select the player who we think is the "best player available..who we think will be gone in the next 32 picks (or however long it is until our next pick)". Occasionally, our earliest picks aren't the ones we are most interested in acquiring, but we figure we can wait to take particular players who we anticipate will be overlooked by NFL teams.
It will be quite a while before we can judge the results from the 2013 Draft, and there are one or two selections that the computer made that I wish I could change. Still, amongst the players that the computer selected, and who have been given an opportunity to prove themselves, I am generally quite pleased with the results so far, and wanted to take a brief look at two of the more interesting results that came from late round selections.
First of all, we have Chris Jones, defensive tackle for the New England Patriots. His initial selection at the end of the 6th round (198th pick overall), already shows the degree to which teams weren't too intrigued by him. Then, the team that drafted him (the Texans) chose to cut Chris Jones before the regular season began, another vote of no confidence. He was promptly picked up by the Buccaneers, who also quickly dropped him before he ever played a single game. Once again, things were looking rather bad. Then, he gets signed by the Patriots, shockingly is allowed to actually play, and accumulates 45 tackles and 5 sacks in his first 8 games started.
I don't want to engage in a subjective analysis of how well he has played, since I don't think that will get us anywhere. Loosely throwing around opinions is pretty useless. However you look at it though, I think it is probably fair to say that Jones' performance has likely exceeded his draft position, and thus the expectations of NFL GMs (experts!). Instead, let's just ask the question "How unlikely was it that Chris Jones would start at least 8 games as a rookie?", a mark he just reached yesterday. If we look back at data from past drafts (1992-2011) we can calculate how unlikely it is that such an occurrence is just a fluke (using historical data from Tony Villiotti at Draftmetrics.com). To even out any irregularities at a particular draft slot, I looked at all the players taken during this 20 year span, that were selected between the 188th pick and the 208th pick (ten spots prior to, and subsequent to where Chris Jones was chosen). In total, there have been 420 players selected in that range in the past 20 years, and only 20 of them managed to start at least 8 games in their rookie year. So, the odds were 1/21 (a 4.76% chance) of such an outcome happening just by blind luck.
Next, we have the case of Paul Worrilow, linebacker for the Atlanta Falcons. Of course, Worrilow wasn't drafted at all, and the Falcons were supposedly the only team to even offer him a chance. Despite this, he has now accumulated 101 tackles and 1.5 sacks, through his first nine games started. Unfortunately, the lack of data related to undrafted players complicates things a bit.. Without this data, I decided to examine the issue as if Worrilow had been selected at the end of the seventh round, figuring that if anything the odds for an undrafted player would probably be even lower. Using the same data from Draftmetrics.com, I examined the situation as if Worrilow had been selected between the 235th pick and the end of the seventh round to get a similar sample size to the one we had with Chris Jones. In this case, we had 421 players during this 20 year time frame that had been selected in the range, with only 7 managing to start at least 8 games in their rookie season. That works out to a 1/60.14 probability (a 1.66% chance), of such an event occurring due to dumb luck.
Where this becomes really interesting is when we ask the question "What were the odds of a team selecting 2 such players in the same draft?". The odds of both events occurring would be 1/1262.94 (a 0.079% chance). To be fair though, Team Kangaroo had 5 selections from the end of the 6th round to the end of the 7th round, so our actual odds were closer to 1/252.5 (or 0.395% a chance). Either way, those odds do make you wonder about the likelihood of whether the computer was just lucky, or if taking a more objective view of a player's data might be a reasonable thing to do. It also makes me have a greater appreciation for late round draft picks.
Will either of these player end up as Hall of Famers? Probably not, but that would be a rather unreasonable expectation anyway. Yes, judging a player based on his number of games started as a rookie is obviously questionable. Still, observing the successes of late round and undrafted players, is much more interesting to me than their counterparts who were selected in the first few rounds. The hype factor is less of an issue with the late round players, so getting on the field probably does suggest that a player is doing something right, rather than inheriting a starting role because a team has invested a lot in them. All I'm concerned with is whether I can get anything at all out of a draft pick. I really don't think that selecting "stars" is nearly as important as avoiding "bums", who can tie up a roster spot for years simply because they were highly drafted. Why some players succeed, when nobody was really betting on them doing much, probably reveals more about what really matters.
As for the computer's other picks in 2013, well, some will turn out well and some won't. The biggest question for me is whether a player is given an opportunity to show what he can do, over which I have no control. As it stands, I think the odds are in our favor that a few more of the computer's picks should turn out quite well...if given a chance.
Being wrong doesn't necessarily bother me too much, so long as it doesn't happen too frequently. My main goal is just to explore some ideas on how to optimize a team's chances of success in the NFL Draft, based on more objective data. I can't pretend to have watched the majority of the players when they were in college, and honestly doubt that doing so really is a very reliable method for identifying talent. For the most part, I'm just curious as to whether draft selections chosen by a computer can approach or exceed the results made by NFL GMs. If, indeed they are experts in this field, I should fail horribly. If the GMs are blindly guessing, while posturing as highly paid experts, maybe the results will be surprising. Personally, I suspect that the average fan with a draft magazine and a dart board, could probably do just as well as the best experts, so I aim to encourage a bit of doubt when it comes to blindly trusting the people in charge.
While I have plenty of stupid ideas, the real core of my idiocy probably gets condensed down to my annual Ozzie Newsome Challenge. While teams talk about taking the "best player available", I think it can generally be agreed that all such claims are blatantly bullsh*t. Frequently this familiar line gets modified to "best player available at a position of need", which is more honest, though probably still a bit misguided. It's kind of like going to a party, in search of your future wife/sandwich maker, and saying that you are seeking the "best wife available....with exceptionally large breasts". The added qualifier "with exceptionally large breasts" sort of reveals what your real motives are. For instance, do you really think that Matt Elam and Arthur Brown (the Ravens' first 2 selections in the 2013 Draft), were the best players available? Or, were the Ravens blatantly trying to fill holes left by the departure of Ed Reed and Ray Lewis? In the Ozzie Newsome Challenge, we admittedly don't exactly go for best player available either. Instead, we try to select the player who we think is the "best player available..who we think will be gone in the next 32 picks (or however long it is until our next pick)". Occasionally, our earliest picks aren't the ones we are most interested in acquiring, but we figure we can wait to take particular players who we anticipate will be overlooked by NFL teams.
It will be quite a while before we can judge the results from the 2013 Draft, and there are one or two selections that the computer made that I wish I could change. Still, amongst the players that the computer selected, and who have been given an opportunity to prove themselves, I am generally quite pleased with the results so far, and wanted to take a brief look at two of the more interesting results that came from late round selections.
First of all, we have Chris Jones, defensive tackle for the New England Patriots. His initial selection at the end of the 6th round (198th pick overall), already shows the degree to which teams weren't too intrigued by him. Then, the team that drafted him (the Texans) chose to cut Chris Jones before the regular season began, another vote of no confidence. He was promptly picked up by the Buccaneers, who also quickly dropped him before he ever played a single game. Once again, things were looking rather bad. Then, he gets signed by the Patriots, shockingly is allowed to actually play, and accumulates 45 tackles and 5 sacks in his first 8 games started.
I don't want to engage in a subjective analysis of how well he has played, since I don't think that will get us anywhere. Loosely throwing around opinions is pretty useless. However you look at it though, I think it is probably fair to say that Jones' performance has likely exceeded his draft position, and thus the expectations of NFL GMs (experts!). Instead, let's just ask the question "How unlikely was it that Chris Jones would start at least 8 games as a rookie?", a mark he just reached yesterday. If we look back at data from past drafts (1992-2011) we can calculate how unlikely it is that such an occurrence is just a fluke (using historical data from Tony Villiotti at Draftmetrics.com). To even out any irregularities at a particular draft slot, I looked at all the players taken during this 20 year span, that were selected between the 188th pick and the 208th pick (ten spots prior to, and subsequent to where Chris Jones was chosen). In total, there have been 420 players selected in that range in the past 20 years, and only 20 of them managed to start at least 8 games in their rookie year. So, the odds were 1/21 (a 4.76% chance) of such an outcome happening just by blind luck.
Next, we have the case of Paul Worrilow, linebacker for the Atlanta Falcons. Of course, Worrilow wasn't drafted at all, and the Falcons were supposedly the only team to even offer him a chance. Despite this, he has now accumulated 101 tackles and 1.5 sacks, through his first nine games started. Unfortunately, the lack of data related to undrafted players complicates things a bit.. Without this data, I decided to examine the issue as if Worrilow had been selected at the end of the seventh round, figuring that if anything the odds for an undrafted player would probably be even lower. Using the same data from Draftmetrics.com, I examined the situation as if Worrilow had been selected between the 235th pick and the end of the seventh round to get a similar sample size to the one we had with Chris Jones. In this case, we had 421 players during this 20 year time frame that had been selected in the range, with only 7 managing to start at least 8 games in their rookie season. That works out to a 1/60.14 probability (a 1.66% chance), of such an event occurring due to dumb luck.
Where this becomes really interesting is when we ask the question "What were the odds of a team selecting 2 such players in the same draft?". The odds of both events occurring would be 1/1262.94 (a 0.079% chance). To be fair though, Team Kangaroo had 5 selections from the end of the 6th round to the end of the 7th round, so our actual odds were closer to 1/252.5 (or 0.395% a chance). Either way, those odds do make you wonder about the likelihood of whether the computer was just lucky, or if taking a more objective view of a player's data might be a reasonable thing to do. It also makes me have a greater appreciation for late round draft picks.
Will either of these player end up as Hall of Famers? Probably not, but that would be a rather unreasonable expectation anyway. Yes, judging a player based on his number of games started as a rookie is obviously questionable. Still, observing the successes of late round and undrafted players, is much more interesting to me than their counterparts who were selected in the first few rounds. The hype factor is less of an issue with the late round players, so getting on the field probably does suggest that a player is doing something right, rather than inheriting a starting role because a team has invested a lot in them. All I'm concerned with is whether I can get anything at all out of a draft pick. I really don't think that selecting "stars" is nearly as important as avoiding "bums", who can tie up a roster spot for years simply because they were highly drafted. Why some players succeed, when nobody was really betting on them doing much, probably reveals more about what really matters.
As for the computer's other picks in 2013, well, some will turn out well and some won't. The biggest question for me is whether a player is given an opportunity to show what he can do, over which I have no control. As it stands, I think the odds are in our favor that a few more of the computer's picks should turn out quite well...if given a chance.
Sunday, November 24, 2013
Vincent Rey: Opportunity Knocks
When the unheralded Vincent Rey embarrassed the Ravens a couple weeks ago, it piqued my interest. With 15 tackles, 3 sacks, 3 passes defensed, and 1 interception, Rey clearly stood out, even if getting sacks against the Ravens' interior offensive line isn't quite as challenging as it should be (Gradkowski!). He then followed that up with another fine, if somewhat less shocking performance against the Browns the next week (12 tackles, and 1 pass defensed). So, I thought it would be interesting to go back and see what the story was with this strange individual from Duke, and why he went undrafted in 2010.
First, let's look at how he performed at his college pro day (since nobody bothered to invite him to the combine). His Kangaroo Score (measuring lower body explosiveness) and his Agility Score (from the short shuttle and 3-cone drill), will be shown in the form of how many standard deviations he was above or below average, relative to his peers. His other measurements are more obvious. I'll also include the results for the linebackers who were taken in first 2 rounds (excluding 3-4 OLBs), just for comparison.
Since I don't separate linebackers into different groups (because where they wind up playing could vary), such as MLBs, 3-4 OLBs, or 4-3 inside or outside linebackers, or whatever, this can create an issue over the Kangaroo Score for smaller linebackers. The larger 3-4 OLBs throw off the curve for these smaller players, and can create a bad impression about results that are actually pretty good. To adjust the scale a bit, for better understanding, I'll throw this out there. The average results for middle linebackers is probably closer to -0.800 (for now, use that as the baseline for judging these Kangaroo Scores). The average Kangaroo Score for Pro Bowl or All Pro MLBs would be -0.362.
So, compared to his more highly drafted brethren, Vincent Rey would have been the fastest (40 time), 2nd most explosive (Kangaroo), and 2nd most agile. His physical stature, at 6' 2", 240#, would have also fit right in with his peers. Despite all of this, descriptions of Rey, prior to the 2010 draft, often mentioned his "lack of size" or " limited speed and athleticism". Considering the lack of interest that teams showed in him, it seems that they shared similar thoughts. Of course, none of this really makes any sense, but what can you do? Perhaps the funniest aspect of this is how Rolando McClain's athletic ability was described at the time. CBS praised McClain's,"balance, speed and pursuit quickness", while his actual measurable results screamed "average to poor".
Still, having athletic ability is only part of the story. At some point, you want to see a player actually produce in college. So, let's look at Vincent Rey's college stats in his final 3 years, leaving out his freshman season when he got limited playing time.
I wouldn't claim that these are the most shocking stats I have ever seen for a linebacker, but they certainly look quite solid. So, let's compare these stats to the frequently mocked Rolando McClain, who was selected with the 8th overall pick in the same draft, despite his significantly worse athletic ability.
While McClain played for a vastly more powerful college team (Alabama), his overall statistical production rarely exceeded that of Vincent Rey. The main difference between them would be the number of tackles for a loss that McClain had, though the degree to which McClain can credit the talent of his teammates for this is debatable. Even here, though, McClain only significantly bested Rey in their senior years, with Rey tending to produce at a more regular and steady pace. There is also the pesky issue of McClain playing in, approximately, 14 games each year, while Rey only played in about 12. So McClain was on the field for about 15% more games. Either way, I wouldn't say that either player was leaps and bounds ahead of the other, in terms of actual college results.
None of this is meant to imply that Vincent Rey should have been selected in the 1st round. If anything, it is more of a statement about how unwise a selection that McClain was. Speculating as to when Rey should have been selected is pointless. I just think that when you weigh his physical potential and production, against that of his peers, you start to wonder why such a prospect was completely ignored. A mid round pick would have seemed to be a fair gamble. I certainly don't want to portray Rey as the next Brian Urlacher, but compared to many of the foolish picks that teams make, Rey seems to possess a rather plausible resume that NFL GMs should have taken more seriously. It's still early in his career, and I can't say how things will turn out, or if he will continue to get an opportunity, but looking back at his numbers, he strikes me as a rather intriguing player who I wouldn't bet against doing quite well. I'll be curious to see what happens with him.
Also, because I thought it was an interesting article, some of you might be interested in reading this, which gives some description of Rey's background, and how being overlooked seems to have been a bit of a trend in his life. Overall, this piece gives me the impression that he is a decent hardworking kid, that somehow slipped through the cracks.
First, let's look at how he performed at his college pro day (since nobody bothered to invite him to the combine). His Kangaroo Score (measuring lower body explosiveness) and his Agility Score (from the short shuttle and 3-cone drill), will be shown in the form of how many standard deviations he was above or below average, relative to his peers. His other measurements are more obvious. I'll also include the results for the linebackers who were taken in first 2 rounds (excluding 3-4 OLBs), just for comparison.
| NAME | Height | Weight | 40 Yard | Kangaroo | Agility | Pick # |
| Vincent Rey | 6'2" | 240 | 4.58 | 0.436 | 0.871 | U |
| Rolando McClain | 6' 3.3" | 249 | 4.68 | -0.564 | 0.074 | 8 |
| Sean Weatherspoon | 6' 1.3" | 239 | 4.62 | 0.422 | 0.401 | 19 |
| Koa Misi | 6' 2.5" | 251 | 4.75 | 0.976 | 0.551 | 40 |
| Sean Lee | 6' 2.1" | 236 | 4.72 | -0.219 | 1.203 | 55 |
| Brandon Spikes | 6' 2.7" | 249 | 5.05 | -1.282 | N/A | 62 |
| Pat Angerer | 6' 2.2" | 235 | 4.71 | -0.555 | 0.612 | 63 |
Since I don't separate linebackers into different groups (because where they wind up playing could vary), such as MLBs, 3-4 OLBs, or 4-3 inside or outside linebackers, or whatever, this can create an issue over the Kangaroo Score for smaller linebackers. The larger 3-4 OLBs throw off the curve for these smaller players, and can create a bad impression about results that are actually pretty good. To adjust the scale a bit, for better understanding, I'll throw this out there. The average results for middle linebackers is probably closer to -0.800 (for now, use that as the baseline for judging these Kangaroo Scores). The average Kangaroo Score for Pro Bowl or All Pro MLBs would be -0.362.
So, compared to his more highly drafted brethren, Vincent Rey would have been the fastest (40 time), 2nd most explosive (Kangaroo), and 2nd most agile. His physical stature, at 6' 2", 240#, would have also fit right in with his peers. Despite all of this, descriptions of Rey, prior to the 2010 draft, often mentioned his "lack of size" or " limited speed and athleticism". Considering the lack of interest that teams showed in him, it seems that they shared similar thoughts. Of course, none of this really makes any sense, but what can you do? Perhaps the funniest aspect of this is how Rolando McClain's athletic ability was described at the time. CBS praised McClain's,"balance, speed and pursuit quickness", while his actual measurable results screamed "average to poor".
Still, having athletic ability is only part of the story. At some point, you want to see a player actually produce in college. So, let's look at Vincent Rey's college stats in his final 3 years, leaving out his freshman season when he got limited playing time.
| Year | Tackles | TFL | Sack | Int | PD | FF |
| 2009 | 98 | 8.5 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 0 |
| 2008 | 109 | 10.5 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 1 |
| 2007 | 111 | 8.5 | 2.5 | 0 | 4 | 3 |
I wouldn't claim that these are the most shocking stats I have ever seen for a linebacker, but they certainly look quite solid. So, let's compare these stats to the frequently mocked Rolando McClain, who was selected with the 8th overall pick in the same draft, despite his significantly worse athletic ability.
| Year | Tackles | TFL | Sack | Int | PD | FF |
| 2009 | 105 | 14.5 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 1 |
| 2008 | 95 | 12 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 0 |
| 2007 | 75 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 0 |
While McClain played for a vastly more powerful college team (Alabama), his overall statistical production rarely exceeded that of Vincent Rey. The main difference between them would be the number of tackles for a loss that McClain had, though the degree to which McClain can credit the talent of his teammates for this is debatable. Even here, though, McClain only significantly bested Rey in their senior years, with Rey tending to produce at a more regular and steady pace. There is also the pesky issue of McClain playing in, approximately, 14 games each year, while Rey only played in about 12. So McClain was on the field for about 15% more games. Either way, I wouldn't say that either player was leaps and bounds ahead of the other, in terms of actual college results.
None of this is meant to imply that Vincent Rey should have been selected in the 1st round. If anything, it is more of a statement about how unwise a selection that McClain was. Speculating as to when Rey should have been selected is pointless. I just think that when you weigh his physical potential and production, against that of his peers, you start to wonder why such a prospect was completely ignored. A mid round pick would have seemed to be a fair gamble. I certainly don't want to portray Rey as the next Brian Urlacher, but compared to many of the foolish picks that teams make, Rey seems to possess a rather plausible resume that NFL GMs should have taken more seriously. It's still early in his career, and I can't say how things will turn out, or if he will continue to get an opportunity, but looking back at his numbers, he strikes me as a rather intriguing player who I wouldn't bet against doing quite well. I'll be curious to see what happens with him.
Also, because I thought it was an interesting article, some of you might be interested in reading this, which gives some description of Rey's background, and how being overlooked seems to have been a bit of a trend in his life. Overall, this piece gives me the impression that he is a decent hardworking kid, that somehow slipped through the cracks.
Friday, November 1, 2013
The L_B_T_MY Line
I realize that this is sort of like beating a dead horse, but I wanted to continue to pursue some thoughts related to NFL offensive lines.
I've already briefly mentioned some of my weird thoughts related to the athletic qualities I look for when drafting NFL centers. There have also been some earlier posts that lightly explore the traits that I think separate guards from tackles (seen here and here). Still, the question remains, could you actually construct a complete offensive line based on these sorts of simple-minded measurements?
Answering that question is slightly complicated. Still, I thought it would be fun to look back over the past ten years (the 2003-2012 draft classes), and see how the computer could have theoretically done, compared to a typical NFL team. However, since hindsight is 20/20, we have to establish some rules for the computer, to keep things as fair as possible. Many of these rules will significantly handicap the computer, but I wanted to avoid having things appear to be rigged in the computer's favor.
Rule #1- The average NFL team drafts 1.28 offensive linemen each year, or 12.8 players over the ten years we will be looking at. Having the computer select one offensive lineman per year is simple enough, but those extra 2.8 players present a problem. Deciding which years that the computer could pick an extra offensive linemen would be too much of an advantage, since we now know which years had better talent. Instead, I decided to give the advantage to the NFL GMs, and not allow the computer to make the additional selections. So, the computer gets to pick just one player per year, and that's it. NFL GMs will have 28% more opportunities than the computer to get a quality player.
Rule #2- The Kangaroo Score gives equal weight to a player's vertical jump and broad jump. The Agility Score gives equal weight to a player's short shuttle time and their 3-cone drill. Since both scores are given in the form of how many standard deviations above (or below) average that a player is relative to their peers, if we combine both scores we will have a Combined Score that gives each of these four drills equal weight. So, the computer will simply pick whichever player has the best overall results, in terms of general athletic ability. Since I feel that some of these drills matter more for some positions along the line than for others, this is a significant dumbing down of the computer's ability, and I wouldn't suggest taking such a simple approach in reality. The computer is basically being hit in the head with a rock before making its picks, and looking for a 'generic offensive lineman' rather than looking for specific positions along the line.
Additionally the computer will filter out any offensive lineman whose forty yard dash time is worse than 5.20 seconds (the actual average time for linemen is approximately 5.22 seconds). This will be a simple pass/fail type of test, so there will be no benefit to performing exceptionally well here. A player simply has to be average as far as their 40 time is concerned.
Rule #3- The computer can't pick a player unless that player would have been available in the 3rd round or later. There's no point in having the computer select someone, if that player most likely wouldn't have been an available option to most teams. So, every offensive linemen that the computer picks will have been passed over twice by every single team. Similarly, the computer can't select anyone who went undrafted, as I think this would also give some advantages to the computer. Overall, I think this is a fair compromise that tilts things in the favor of the NFL GMs.
With the computer now functioning in a somewhat brain damaged manner, we can now look at who it would have selected in the last ten years. We'll call this the Lobotomy Line, since I think that accurately captures the way that the computer has been impaired. As well as displaying each selection's 40 time, Kangaroo Score, Agility Score, and Combined Score (this being the only score that matters in the eyes of the computer for this little game), we'll also include a few other bits of data for those who are curious. First of all, will be their Draft #, the overall selection that they were chosen with by an NFL team. Secondly, there will be the % Pot GS (Percentage of Potential Games Started). If a player was selected ten years ago, they could have potentially started in 160 games (not counting the post season), and so on. Games not started due to injuries, being out of the league, or other unfortunate circumstances, will still count against a player. This will only be based on a player's "starts" through the 2012 season.
Since there is no universally agreed upon standard for judging offensive linemen, we'll begin by moving the players who started less than 40% of their team's games to the reject pile, before examining the players that remain a bit more closely.
Let's look at the computer's failed picks first, which would include Lydon Murtha, Kelly Butler and Seth Wand. Murtha seemed to show some potential for the Dolphins, but after a couple of injuries, he has magically disappeared from the league. Kelly Butler and Seth Wand, though managing to start 21 and 18 games respectively, also get dumped on the trash heap. Funnily enough, if the computer had been allowed to select players that went undrafted, it would have chosen 5 time Pro Bowler Jason Peters in 2004.(1.136 combined score) rather than Kelly Butler. Interesting food for thought, don't you think? Regardless, it is something we have to ignore (now that I have craftily planted the idea in your mind). I am only mentioning this particular example because it is unlikely, in reality, that we would be selecting a tackle (Butler) with such a poor agility score. In the end, the computer seems to have wasted a 3rd, a 6th and a 7th round pick. As for Brandon Brooks, who only just became a starter in 2013, most of the signs are pointing towards a positive outcome here, and I am still ridiculously confident that things will turn out well for him.
Now, we can look at the computer's better picks.
The Evan Mathis situation is particularly interesting. Generally regarded as one of the top guards in the NFL, his career got off to a slow start. Some people will claim that the early stages of his career were hindered by injuries and that he was slow to develop. People would probably credit his current success to being "coached up", which I feel is most likely nonsense. In his first 6 seasons, he was on 3 different teams, playing in a total of 58 games (with 22 starts). How many sacks did he allow in this time? Well, according to the information I can find, he only allowed 3 sacks (0.136 sacks per game started, in his first 22 starts), which is quite exceptional. Despite the lack of interest that teams showed in him, I don't see any evidence to suggest that he was really struggling. Since then, his numbers have improved even further, to 0.084 sacks per game started.
Everybody knows RT Eric Winston, and would probably agree that he has generally been quite good. Do the Texans miss him? I would think so. Derek Newton (-0.667 Combined Score) has, so far, been a rather depressing replacement for Winston.
Then, there is RT Doug Free, who will probably create a bit of controversy. While Free has had his ups and downs, he is currently having a spectacular 2013. Whatever people may think of him, I suspect he is still better than what most teams have at RT. For a 4th round pick, he seems to present excellent value.
Next, we have G Josh Sitton. Despite the sometimes poor reputation of the Packers' offensive line, I don't think anyone would direct the blame towards Sitton. Unlike Evan Mathis, who took longer to gain recognition, Josh Sitton quickly seized a starting job, and is often ranked among the top guards in the NFL.
If LT Jared Veldheer played for someone other than the Raiders, he might be a more recognizable name. While he struggled some in his rookie year, which isn't surprising considering his transition from Hillsdale College, he has since that time entered the discussion as one of the top young OTs in the league. If he had a weakness early on, it is that he probably committed too many penalties (though that has steadily improved), but he doesn't give up sacks.
Last, but not least, we have C Jason Kelce. Despite being picked in the 6th round, he has started every game since his rookie year, except for those he missed due to injury in 2012. He doesn't give up sacks, allowing just 0.055 per game started, and has generally been a favorite of the guys over at Pro Football Focus. Make of this what you will. Seems to be one of the more intriguing young centers on the rise.
Overall, regardless of your methods for judging offensive linemen, I think most people would agree that 50-60% of the computer's picks (while operating in 'idiot mode') have been quite good, and this could climb as high as 70% depending on how things work out for Brandon Brooks. In the end, I am quite surprised and pleased with the results, and suspect this would have produced a rather intriguing, and possibly spectacular offensive line. While some of the players have areas of relative weakness, I have a hard time imagining that putting them together as a unit wouldn't magnify their strengths. Though I know this is obvious to everyone, players do seem to perform even better when teamed with other superior players.
Now, let's take a look at the results of an actual NFL team. Which team will we choose as an example? Well, since I've already criticized the Ravens a fair bit in the past, we might as well use them. It's probably simpler than offending a different fanbase. That the Ravens are generally perceived as a team that drafts well, also has the obvious advantage of not appearing to pick on the helpless (hmm, like the Jaguars, perhaps).
The Ravens seem to be following more of a whimsical 'just throw the dart and see where it lands' approach to drafting linemen. When using the same "40% of potential games started" criteria, we get a rather extensive list of probable failures for the Ravens. This includes Gino Gradkowksi (now starting, though doing very poorly), Jah Reid, Ramon Harewood, Oniel Cousins, David Hale, Adam Terry, Brian Rimpf, and Mike Mabry.
When it comes to the Ravens' "successes" we wander into much murkier territory.
When we look at OT Tony Pashos, we might as well also look at Michael Oher. Despite the difference in their draft positions, and the expectations that come with that, I think a reasonable argument could be made that there isn't a huge difference between them. In some ways, Pashos might even have a slight edge over Oher. When it comes to sacks allowed per game started, Pashos has allowed 0.45 to Oher's 0.50. So, a minor point in Pashos' favor. If we look at their penalties per games started, Pashos has 0.50, to Oher's 0.59. Again, a point in Pashos' favor. So, the question becomes, is Pashos underrated, or has Oher been a bit overrated? Or, are both of them just mediocre? It seems hard to suggest that Pashos has faced easier circumstances, moving around from the Jaguars, 49ers, Browns, Redskins, and Raiders. In the end, I don't suspect either player is someone that most teams would be clamoring to acquire, though both are probably serviceable. Still, they seem like the sort of players that always leave a team searching for somebody better.
While I personally thought Jason Brown was a rather good center, during his time with the Ravens, his reputation/performance seemed to take a hit when he signed on with the Rams. At the very least, I think we can say he was enough of a success to briefly be the highest paid center in the league. What was it that eventually went wrong, when he wound up in St. Louis? I have no idea.
Current Redskins' guard, Chris Chester, also creates an interesting debate. I am forced to count him as a success because of the number of games he has started, but I find it hard to believe that anyone would argue that he is particularly good. I suspect most Ravens fans would laugh at this suggestion. You can make up your own mind about this situation.
The selection of guards Marshal Yanda and Ben Grubbs, are probably the two most undeniable successes for the Ravens in the last 10 years. Both have been highly regarded, and I can see no reason to complain about either pick.
Lastly, we come to guard Kelechi Osemele. Despite the initial optimism people had about him, he appears to have been on a gradual downhill slide since his rookie year. While he gets starting opportunities, he has so far been rather unimpressive. Many people seem to be suggesting that his struggles are due to the talent that surrounds him, but I don't think a genuinely great player would need to have such excuses made on his behalf. Still, it is early in his career, so who knows what will happen here?
I suspect someone will want to point out Jah Reid's lack of success, despite his excellent measurables, as compared to Ben Grubbs, who was athletically somewhat below average. All I can say here is "Yup, this sort of thing happens". A player's athletic ability, as measured at the combine, doesn't guarantee success or failure. I merely want to suggest that the odds are generally in favor of the athletically superior, and worth betting on. Players tend to meet the expectations set by their athletic ability more often than they exceed them, at least as far as I have been able to judge these things.
If we are being extremely generous, this would mean that 46.6% of the Ravens selections could be called successes. Still, I think that most people would agree that their true success rate is probably a fair bit lower than this. If we determined that just 2 of the Ravens' 'successes' were highly debatable (take your pick as to which 2), their success rate would drop to 33%, and we could be even harsher if we chose to. How you choose to evaluate this, in comparison to the computer's selections is entirely up to you. One thing to remember though, is that the Ravens, with their 15 selections, had 50% more opportunities to get it right. A full third of their picks also came in the first two rounds of the draft (with two 1st round picks, and three 2nd round picks), where the computer was forbidden to make selections.
When we try to evaluate the likelihood of a player developing into someone useful, we also run into some peculiar issues. The average player's result, in terms of percentage of potential games started, isn't that much worse for the Ravens than it is for the computer. The Ravens come in with an average result of 40.49%, versus a somewhat better result of 48.82% for the computer. The problem we have here is that the Ravens results seem to be heavily weighted by a few outliers, that are having a heavy influence on their results. This largely seems to stem from their higher draft picks, who get many starting opportunities regardless of their actual performance. If we look instead at the median results for percentage of potential games started, the Ravens fall to 21.87%, versus 44.85% for the computer. That would be a rather commanding lead for the computer's picks.
While I think the computer's theoretical draft results could arguably be considered to be twice as good as those of the Ravens (depending on how generous you want to be towards the Ravens' picks), there is the question of whether this could be accomplished in reality. Let's look at some obvious angles from which all of this could be criticized.
1. This all assumes a reasonable knowledge of where the players would actually be selected. In reality, how would you snake these players before someone else selected them?
Generally, the pre-draft speculation as to what round players will be selected in is fairly accurate, though this accuracy diminishes towards the later rounds. I have no problem with taking a player as high as a full round ahead of where the conventional wisdom says he is projected to go, if it means getting the player I want, and if he is someone the computer deems a best-in-class prospect. People will probably criticize this as "reaching" for a player, while ignoring how bad most teams more conventional "value" picks actually are.
2. Some of the computer's picks were relatively high in the 3rd round. Wouldn't many teams have to actually select them in the 2nd round, if they were intent on acquiring them?
Well, that's true, though trading up in the third round is a possibility too. Having to take a player in the second round, in order to get them, also opens up the possibility of taking other, potentially more highly rated players, that we didn't examine here because of the rule forbidding us from going after players in the first 2 rounds. Even when I ran this same little test with the computer restricted to picks that were available in the 4th round or later, the computer arguably did at least as well as the typical NFL GM.
3. So, the computer was right maybe 50-60% (though I suspect it will soon be 70%) of the time. Big deal! That's not that impressive!
Well, in reality, I don't think anybody is likely to see a success rate that is significantly higher than 70%. Somewhere around the 70% mark I've run into the issues of injuries, teams potentially neglecting/misusing talent, and the general unpredictability of human nature, as significant obstacles, regardless of how I approach this subject. I realize that people want to find some sort of magic formula that will result in 90% of a team's picks being outrageous successes, but this simply isn't going to happen. We also have to remember that the computer is operating with at least one hand tied behind its back in this little game. With that said, I still think these results are probably surprisingly close to optimal, even if I would prefer to do things somewhat differently in reality (weighting the scores differently, and including more data in other areas). While I aim for the 70% mark, hitting on 50-60% is still a decent outcome, and significantly better than what most teams could probably manage. It is also worth remembering that NFL teams, on average, only have about 21.5% of their picks turn out to be successful. We're just looking for a little edge, that over time will tilt things in our favor.
Remember, this is just a game I'm playing here, so take this all with a grain of salt. While we can incorporate more data than I've shown here, and weigh the data more intelligently than we have in this incredibly simplified example, I think it might illustrate some of the potential benefits of using objective data rather than the "gut feeling" that most GMs seem to rely upon. While I won't quote the great philosopher Rob Gordon, I think we all know what our guts are full of. If nothing else, I think all of this raises some interesting questions relating to the supposed expertise and 'eye for talent', that GMs and scouts allegedly bring to the table.
I've already briefly mentioned some of my weird thoughts related to the athletic qualities I look for when drafting NFL centers. There have also been some earlier posts that lightly explore the traits that I think separate guards from tackles (seen here and here). Still, the question remains, could you actually construct a complete offensive line based on these sorts of simple-minded measurements?
Answering that question is slightly complicated. Still, I thought it would be fun to look back over the past ten years (the 2003-2012 draft classes), and see how the computer could have theoretically done, compared to a typical NFL team. However, since hindsight is 20/20, we have to establish some rules for the computer, to keep things as fair as possible. Many of these rules will significantly handicap the computer, but I wanted to avoid having things appear to be rigged in the computer's favor.
Rule #1- The average NFL team drafts 1.28 offensive linemen each year, or 12.8 players over the ten years we will be looking at. Having the computer select one offensive lineman per year is simple enough, but those extra 2.8 players present a problem. Deciding which years that the computer could pick an extra offensive linemen would be too much of an advantage, since we now know which years had better talent. Instead, I decided to give the advantage to the NFL GMs, and not allow the computer to make the additional selections. So, the computer gets to pick just one player per year, and that's it. NFL GMs will have 28% more opportunities than the computer to get a quality player.
Rule #2- The Kangaroo Score gives equal weight to a player's vertical jump and broad jump. The Agility Score gives equal weight to a player's short shuttle time and their 3-cone drill. Since both scores are given in the form of how many standard deviations above (or below) average that a player is relative to their peers, if we combine both scores we will have a Combined Score that gives each of these four drills equal weight. So, the computer will simply pick whichever player has the best overall results, in terms of general athletic ability. Since I feel that some of these drills matter more for some positions along the line than for others, this is a significant dumbing down of the computer's ability, and I wouldn't suggest taking such a simple approach in reality. The computer is basically being hit in the head with a rock before making its picks, and looking for a 'generic offensive lineman' rather than looking for specific positions along the line.
Additionally the computer will filter out any offensive lineman whose forty yard dash time is worse than 5.20 seconds (the actual average time for linemen is approximately 5.22 seconds). This will be a simple pass/fail type of test, so there will be no benefit to performing exceptionally well here. A player simply has to be average as far as their 40 time is concerned.
Rule #3- The computer can't pick a player unless that player would have been available in the 3rd round or later. There's no point in having the computer select someone, if that player most likely wouldn't have been an available option to most teams. So, every offensive linemen that the computer picks will have been passed over twice by every single team. Similarly, the computer can't select anyone who went undrafted, as I think this would also give some advantages to the computer. Overall, I think this is a fair compromise that tilts things in the favor of the NFL GMs.
With the computer now functioning in a somewhat brain damaged manner, we can now look at who it would have selected in the last ten years. We'll call this the Lobotomy Line, since I think that accurately captures the way that the computer has been impaired. As well as displaying each selection's 40 time, Kangaroo Score, Agility Score, and Combined Score (this being the only score that matters in the eyes of the computer for this little game), we'll also include a few other bits of data for those who are curious. First of all, will be their Draft #, the overall selection that they were chosen with by an NFL team. Secondly, there will be the % Pot GS (Percentage of Potential Games Started). If a player was selected ten years ago, they could have potentially started in 160 games (not counting the post season), and so on. Games not started due to injuries, being out of the league, or other unfortunate circumstances, will still count against a player. This will only be based on a player's "starts" through the 2012 season.
| Player | Year | Pick # | 40 yard | Kangaroo | Agility | Combined | % of Pot. GS |
| Brandon Brooks | 2012 | 76 | 4.99 | 1.992 | 1.250 | 1.621 | 0 |
| Jason Kelce | 2011 | 191 | 4.89 | -0.537 | 2.472 | 0.967 | 56.25 |
| Jared Veldheer | 2010 | 69 | 5.06 | 1.070 | 1.246 | 1.158 | 89.58 |
| Lydon Murtha | 2009 | 228 | 4.82 | 1.190 | 2.265 | 1.727 | 6.25 |
| Josh Sitton | 2008 | 135 | 5.20 | 0.665 | 1.005 | 0.835 | 80 |
| Doug Free | 2007 | 122 | 5.19 | 1.248 | 1.233 | 1.241 | 57.29 |
| Eric Winston | 2006 | 66 | 4.94 | 0.612 | 1.879 | 1.246 | 91.96 |
| Evan Mathis | 2005 | 79 | 4.92 | 1.677 | 2.122 | 1.900 | 41.4 |
| Kelly Butler | 2004 | 172 | 5.11 | 2.718 | -0.864 | 0.927 | 14.58 |
| Seth Wand | 2003 | 75 | 5.14 | 1.221 | 0.899 | 1.060 | 11.25 |
| AVERAGE | 121.3 | 44.85 | |||||
| MEDIAN | 100.5 | 48.82 |
Since there is no universally agreed upon standard for judging offensive linemen, we'll begin by moving the players who started less than 40% of their team's games to the reject pile, before examining the players that remain a bit more closely.
Let's look at the computer's failed picks first, which would include Lydon Murtha, Kelly Butler and Seth Wand. Murtha seemed to show some potential for the Dolphins, but after a couple of injuries, he has magically disappeared from the league. Kelly Butler and Seth Wand, though managing to start 21 and 18 games respectively, also get dumped on the trash heap. Funnily enough, if the computer had been allowed to select players that went undrafted, it would have chosen 5 time Pro Bowler Jason Peters in 2004.(1.136 combined score) rather than Kelly Butler. Interesting food for thought, don't you think? Regardless, it is something we have to ignore (now that I have craftily planted the idea in your mind). I am only mentioning this particular example because it is unlikely, in reality, that we would be selecting a tackle (Butler) with such a poor agility score. In the end, the computer seems to have wasted a 3rd, a 6th and a 7th round pick. As for Brandon Brooks, who only just became a starter in 2013, most of the signs are pointing towards a positive outcome here, and I am still ridiculously confident that things will turn out well for him.
Now, we can look at the computer's better picks.
The Evan Mathis situation is particularly interesting. Generally regarded as one of the top guards in the NFL, his career got off to a slow start. Some people will claim that the early stages of his career were hindered by injuries and that he was slow to develop. People would probably credit his current success to being "coached up", which I feel is most likely nonsense. In his first 6 seasons, he was on 3 different teams, playing in a total of 58 games (with 22 starts). How many sacks did he allow in this time? Well, according to the information I can find, he only allowed 3 sacks (0.136 sacks per game started, in his first 22 starts), which is quite exceptional. Despite the lack of interest that teams showed in him, I don't see any evidence to suggest that he was really struggling. Since then, his numbers have improved even further, to 0.084 sacks per game started.
Everybody knows RT Eric Winston, and would probably agree that he has generally been quite good. Do the Texans miss him? I would think so. Derek Newton (-0.667 Combined Score) has, so far, been a rather depressing replacement for Winston.
Then, there is RT Doug Free, who will probably create a bit of controversy. While Free has had his ups and downs, he is currently having a spectacular 2013. Whatever people may think of him, I suspect he is still better than what most teams have at RT. For a 4th round pick, he seems to present excellent value.
Next, we have G Josh Sitton. Despite the sometimes poor reputation of the Packers' offensive line, I don't think anyone would direct the blame towards Sitton. Unlike Evan Mathis, who took longer to gain recognition, Josh Sitton quickly seized a starting job, and is often ranked among the top guards in the NFL.
If LT Jared Veldheer played for someone other than the Raiders, he might be a more recognizable name. While he struggled some in his rookie year, which isn't surprising considering his transition from Hillsdale College, he has since that time entered the discussion as one of the top young OTs in the league. If he had a weakness early on, it is that he probably committed too many penalties (though that has steadily improved), but he doesn't give up sacks.
Last, but not least, we have C Jason Kelce. Despite being picked in the 6th round, he has started every game since his rookie year, except for those he missed due to injury in 2012. He doesn't give up sacks, allowing just 0.055 per game started, and has generally been a favorite of the guys over at Pro Football Focus. Make of this what you will. Seems to be one of the more intriguing young centers on the rise.
Overall, regardless of your methods for judging offensive linemen, I think most people would agree that 50-60% of the computer's picks (while operating in 'idiot mode') have been quite good, and this could climb as high as 70% depending on how things work out for Brandon Brooks. In the end, I am quite surprised and pleased with the results, and suspect this would have produced a rather intriguing, and possibly spectacular offensive line. While some of the players have areas of relative weakness, I have a hard time imagining that putting them together as a unit wouldn't magnify their strengths. Though I know this is obvious to everyone, players do seem to perform even better when teamed with other superior players.
Now, let's take a look at the results of an actual NFL team. Which team will we choose as an example? Well, since I've already criticized the Ravens a fair bit in the past, we might as well use them. It's probably simpler than offending a different fanbase. That the Ravens are generally perceived as a team that drafts well, also has the obvious advantage of not appearing to pick on the helpless (hmm, like the Jaguars, perhaps).
| Player | Year | Pick # | 40 yard | Kangaroo | Agility | Combined | % of Pot. GS |
| Kelechi Osemele | 2012 | 60 | 5.22 | 0.500 | -0.538 | -0.018 | 100 |
| Gino Gradkowski | 2012 | 98 | 5.25 | -0.509 | -0.034 | -0.271 | 0 |
| Jah Reid | 2011 | 85 | 5.32 | 1.291 | 0.319 | 0.805 | 21.87 |
| Ramon Harewood | 2010 | 194 | 5.11 | 0.943 | N/A | N/A | 10.41 |
| Michael Oher | 2009 | 23 | 5.34 | 0.134 | 0.194 | 0.164 | 100 |
| Oniel Cousins | 2008 | 99 | 5.11 | -0.515 | -0.348 | -0.432 | 6.25 |
| David Hale | 2008 | 133 | 5.27 | -0.579 | 0.145 | -0.217 | 0 |
| Ben Grubbs | 2007 | 29 | 5.18 | -0.393 | -0.311 | -0.352 | 89.58 |
| Marshall Yanda | 2007 | 86 | 5.15 | -0.611 | 1.146 | 0.267 | 75 |
| Chris Chester | 2006 | 56 | 4.83 | 0.260 | 1.321 | 0.791 | 70.53 |
| Adam Terry | 2005 | 64 | 5.40 | 0.009 | -0.324 | -0.157 | 14.06 |
| Jason Brown | 2005 | 124 | 5.40 | 0.437 | 0.656 | 0.546 | 71.09 |
| Brian Rimpf | 2004 | 246 | 5.41 | 0.280 | -0.147 | 0.066 | 4.86 |
| Tony Pashos | 2003 | 173 | 5.30 | N/A | N/A | N/A | 43.75 |
| Mike Mabry | 2003 | 250 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 0 |
| AVERAGE | 114.6 | 40.49 | |||||
| MEDIAN | 98 | 21.87 |
The Ravens seem to be following more of a whimsical 'just throw the dart and see where it lands' approach to drafting linemen. When using the same "40% of potential games started" criteria, we get a rather extensive list of probable failures for the Ravens. This includes Gino Gradkowksi (now starting, though doing very poorly), Jah Reid, Ramon Harewood, Oniel Cousins, David Hale, Adam Terry, Brian Rimpf, and Mike Mabry.
When it comes to the Ravens' "successes" we wander into much murkier territory.
When we look at OT Tony Pashos, we might as well also look at Michael Oher. Despite the difference in their draft positions, and the expectations that come with that, I think a reasonable argument could be made that there isn't a huge difference between them. In some ways, Pashos might even have a slight edge over Oher. When it comes to sacks allowed per game started, Pashos has allowed 0.45 to Oher's 0.50. So, a minor point in Pashos' favor. If we look at their penalties per games started, Pashos has 0.50, to Oher's 0.59. Again, a point in Pashos' favor. So, the question becomes, is Pashos underrated, or has Oher been a bit overrated? Or, are both of them just mediocre? It seems hard to suggest that Pashos has faced easier circumstances, moving around from the Jaguars, 49ers, Browns, Redskins, and Raiders. In the end, I don't suspect either player is someone that most teams would be clamoring to acquire, though both are probably serviceable. Still, they seem like the sort of players that always leave a team searching for somebody better.
While I personally thought Jason Brown was a rather good center, during his time with the Ravens, his reputation/performance seemed to take a hit when he signed on with the Rams. At the very least, I think we can say he was enough of a success to briefly be the highest paid center in the league. What was it that eventually went wrong, when he wound up in St. Louis? I have no idea.
Current Redskins' guard, Chris Chester, also creates an interesting debate. I am forced to count him as a success because of the number of games he has started, but I find it hard to believe that anyone would argue that he is particularly good. I suspect most Ravens fans would laugh at this suggestion. You can make up your own mind about this situation.
The selection of guards Marshal Yanda and Ben Grubbs, are probably the two most undeniable successes for the Ravens in the last 10 years. Both have been highly regarded, and I can see no reason to complain about either pick.
Lastly, we come to guard Kelechi Osemele. Despite the initial optimism people had about him, he appears to have been on a gradual downhill slide since his rookie year. While he gets starting opportunities, he has so far been rather unimpressive. Many people seem to be suggesting that his struggles are due to the talent that surrounds him, but I don't think a genuinely great player would need to have such excuses made on his behalf. Still, it is early in his career, so who knows what will happen here?
I suspect someone will want to point out Jah Reid's lack of success, despite his excellent measurables, as compared to Ben Grubbs, who was athletically somewhat below average. All I can say here is "Yup, this sort of thing happens". A player's athletic ability, as measured at the combine, doesn't guarantee success or failure. I merely want to suggest that the odds are generally in favor of the athletically superior, and worth betting on. Players tend to meet the expectations set by their athletic ability more often than they exceed them, at least as far as I have been able to judge these things.
If we are being extremely generous, this would mean that 46.6% of the Ravens selections could be called successes. Still, I think that most people would agree that their true success rate is probably a fair bit lower than this. If we determined that just 2 of the Ravens' 'successes' were highly debatable (take your pick as to which 2), their success rate would drop to 33%, and we could be even harsher if we chose to. How you choose to evaluate this, in comparison to the computer's selections is entirely up to you. One thing to remember though, is that the Ravens, with their 15 selections, had 50% more opportunities to get it right. A full third of their picks also came in the first two rounds of the draft (with two 1st round picks, and three 2nd round picks), where the computer was forbidden to make selections.
When we try to evaluate the likelihood of a player developing into someone useful, we also run into some peculiar issues. The average player's result, in terms of percentage of potential games started, isn't that much worse for the Ravens than it is for the computer. The Ravens come in with an average result of 40.49%, versus a somewhat better result of 48.82% for the computer. The problem we have here is that the Ravens results seem to be heavily weighted by a few outliers, that are having a heavy influence on their results. This largely seems to stem from their higher draft picks, who get many starting opportunities regardless of their actual performance. If we look instead at the median results for percentage of potential games started, the Ravens fall to 21.87%, versus 44.85% for the computer. That would be a rather commanding lead for the computer's picks.
While I think the computer's theoretical draft results could arguably be considered to be twice as good as those of the Ravens (depending on how generous you want to be towards the Ravens' picks), there is the question of whether this could be accomplished in reality. Let's look at some obvious angles from which all of this could be criticized.
1. This all assumes a reasonable knowledge of where the players would actually be selected. In reality, how would you snake these players before someone else selected them?
Generally, the pre-draft speculation as to what round players will be selected in is fairly accurate, though this accuracy diminishes towards the later rounds. I have no problem with taking a player as high as a full round ahead of where the conventional wisdom says he is projected to go, if it means getting the player I want, and if he is someone the computer deems a best-in-class prospect. People will probably criticize this as "reaching" for a player, while ignoring how bad most teams more conventional "value" picks actually are.
2. Some of the computer's picks were relatively high in the 3rd round. Wouldn't many teams have to actually select them in the 2nd round, if they were intent on acquiring them?
Well, that's true, though trading up in the third round is a possibility too. Having to take a player in the second round, in order to get them, also opens up the possibility of taking other, potentially more highly rated players, that we didn't examine here because of the rule forbidding us from going after players in the first 2 rounds. Even when I ran this same little test with the computer restricted to picks that were available in the 4th round or later, the computer arguably did at least as well as the typical NFL GM.
3. So, the computer was right maybe 50-60% (though I suspect it will soon be 70%) of the time. Big deal! That's not that impressive!
Well, in reality, I don't think anybody is likely to see a success rate that is significantly higher than 70%. Somewhere around the 70% mark I've run into the issues of injuries, teams potentially neglecting/misusing talent, and the general unpredictability of human nature, as significant obstacles, regardless of how I approach this subject. I realize that people want to find some sort of magic formula that will result in 90% of a team's picks being outrageous successes, but this simply isn't going to happen. We also have to remember that the computer is operating with at least one hand tied behind its back in this little game. With that said, I still think these results are probably surprisingly close to optimal, even if I would prefer to do things somewhat differently in reality (weighting the scores differently, and including more data in other areas). While I aim for the 70% mark, hitting on 50-60% is still a decent outcome, and significantly better than what most teams could probably manage. It is also worth remembering that NFL teams, on average, only have about 21.5% of their picks turn out to be successful. We're just looking for a little edge, that over time will tilt things in our favor.
Remember, this is just a game I'm playing here, so take this all with a grain of salt. While we can incorporate more data than I've shown here, and weigh the data more intelligently than we have in this incredibly simplified example, I think it might illustrate some of the potential benefits of using objective data rather than the "gut feeling" that most GMs seem to rely upon. While I won't quote the great philosopher Rob Gordon, I think we all know what our guts are full of. If nothing else, I think all of this raises some interesting questions relating to the supposed expertise and 'eye for talent', that GMs and scouts allegedly bring to the table.
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