2016 Free Agent Dumpster Diving

We've been feeling a bit sluggish lately, and were considering the possibility of not doing a post about free agency this year.  It's just not a subject that really excites either Reilly or myself.  Then, we realized that we could use this as an opportunity to ridicule Stephen Ross, and the Dolphins in general, which picked up our spirits a little bit.  After all, we don't really have much else to do until after the NFL Combine.

It really struck us as a mildly interesting coincidence that two of the players who interest us the most, among this year's potential free agents, come from the same poorly run team, the humble Dolphins.  The poor sorry bastards we speak of would be running back Lamar Miller, and wide receiver Rishard Matthews.  Now, don't get me wrong, we're not going to suggest that vast sums of money should be spent on either of these goofballs, we just think they are oddly interesting individuals, with potentially similar issues.  We've liked them both, ever since they were mere draft prospects, and we're just curious as to whether they can escape the black hole that is Miami.

I guess we might as well start off with Lamar Miller, since we've already dropped him into the conversation of misused and under-appreciated players several times in the past.  Watching Miller's career over the past four seasons has been more than just a little bit frustrating for us.  As far as I can tell, Dolphins fans seem to be a bit divided as to how they feel about Miller, which is fine.  Really, it's the attitude of the team's management that confuses us the most.

Over the past few years, there seems to have been a recurring message from the team, that they wished Miller was a more physical runner.  I suppose they want a player who they can consistently pound between the tackles, which is fine.  Such players do exist, and aren't that difficult to find.  The problem is, Miller probably isn't really built for that.  Despite weighing a reported 225 pounds, we still feel his measurable traits from the combine point towards him being an outside the tackles runner, which is they area where he seems to have thrived so far in his career.  With a 0.071 Kangaroo Score, a 0.857 Agility Score, a 40 time of 4.34 seconds (with a 2nd Gear Score of 0.19), his strengths seems to lean in the direction of speed and elusiveness.  You could somewhat fairly say that Miller has more in common with Jamaal Charles than he does with Adrian Peterson, based on these results.  Unfortunately, all the Dolphins appear to see is a fairly large bodied running back, and not the skills that Miller actually possesses.  So, they keep trying to bang that square peg into a round hole.  The Dolphins management are, what we call in this field of study, "idiots".

Now, I'm not saying that Miller can't run the ball between the tackles, but with a player that has rather pedestrian lower body power (again, referring to the Kangaroo Score) it probably is more likely that they are going to require a respectable offensive line to consistently execute those sorts of running plays.  That's probably not something the Dolphins have really provided.

There are some fine stat geeks out there who have made attempts to judge an offensive line's ability to assist running backs on plays like this, but I still find this subject to be a bit murky and debatable.  Instead, I thought we would just show the Dolphins sack rates over the last 5 seasons, which I realize can appear to be an entirely unrelated issue.  Just bear with me here.

Year	Sack Rate
2015	7.10%
2014	7.17%
2013	8.89%
2012	6.83%
2011	9.98%

While the precise extent to which an offensive line is helping or hurting a running back is a bit foggy, I think we can agree that the Dolphins O-Line has been a bit sub-par the past few seasons, when it comes to pass protection.  Some might even say that they suck.  Is it likely that they are significantly better as run blockers? I kind of doubt it, but the sort of athletic traits we look for in pass blockers, are also things we look at in run blockers, and I can't say that many of the players on their line have ever struck me as very interesting in either area.

Let's think about some of the linemen this team employed in 2015.  Even if we can accept that Branden Albert and Mike Pouncey might be above average players (though I have some minor arguments against this), the rest of their line was horribly suspect.  Billy Turner?  Jason Fox?  The laughably horrible Dallas Thomas (who has allowed 16 sacks in his past 25 games)?  No, for the most part these guys are bozos.  It almost makes you wonder if people were too harsh with poor Richie Incognito, and his questionable motivational techniques.  Where is the great Jonathan Martin now, you sensitive hippies?  Oh, right, he's out of the league, because he sucked.  In retrospect, it makes you wonder if the lunatic was right, even if his tactics seemed a bit absurd. 

Let's also consider the extent to which the team has continually tried to ignore what Miller has contributed, despite his circumstances.  Miller has maintained a career rushing average of 4.6 yards, while accumulating 2,930 rushing yards, 887 receiving yards, and a combined total of 22 touchdowns.  Despite that, the Dolphins have only handed the ball off to him about 12.8 times per game over the last 2 seasons.  Yet, people only seem to see the lack of gaudy rushing totals, as if that was entirely his fault, and question the value of resigning him.

What if we looked at the two former 1st round running backs that the Dolphins have brought in from other teams, during the past few seasons, in their attempts to find their savior.  Those players would be Knowshon Moreno and Reggie Bush.  Both of these players came to the Dolphins in their 6th NFL season, with varying amounts of hype, but how had their statistical performances measured up at that point in their careers, compared to what Lamar Miller has done in his first four seasons?

 

Rushing
Player	Att.	Yards	Avg.	TD
R. Bush	524	2090	3.98	17
K. Moreno	845	3468	4.10	26
L. Miller	638	2930	4.59	19

Receiving
Player	Rec.	Yards	Avg.	TD
R. Bush	294	2142	7.28	12
K. Moreno	157	1401	8.92	9
L. Miller	117	887	7.58	3

Outside of the obvious disparity in opportunities, the results of these other players aren't noticeably better than those of Miller.  You also have to consider that Moreno and Bush were brought to the Dolphins when they were 26, while Miller is still just 24.  We can also point to the fact that Moreno and Bush came to the team having both missed 25% of the their career games due to injury, while Miller has so far only been on the inactive roster for 4.7% of his games.  Yet, Moreno and Bush were brought in with some apparent intention of being utilized as starting running backs, while Miller has always been treated as if he were a step away from getting benched.  Would Miller be treated differently, if he wasn't a former 4th round pick, but a 1st rounder instead?  I suspect so, and that thought irritates me to a surprising degree.

Look, this whole situation is a mystery to me.  I just find it interesting to contemplate the lunatic ways in which the minds of NFL GMs appear to operate.  Am I endorsing that the Dolphins, or anybody else should spend vast sums to acquire Lamar Miller?  No, absolutely not.  I just think it would be nice to see him wind up somewhere that he could be appreciated for what he is, rather than treated like a red-headed step-child.

Okay, that's enough ranting on that subject.  Let's move on to Rishard Matthews.

I think part of what makes Matthews interesting, probably stems from my deranged fascination with Lamar Miller.  There seems to be a similar mount of neglect that has been given to both players.  What this potential neglect says about how the Dolphins are run, and their ability to get the best players on the field, I won't say.  I just think it is a bit interesting to observe.  It's sort of like watching Donald Trump run for president, oddly fascinating and disturbing at the same time.

Now, when Matthews came to the league in the 2012 draft, Reilly and I probably would have ranked him somewhere in the range of our 7th or 8th highest rated receiver prospect for that year.  At a whisker over six feet tall, and weighing (at the time) 217 pounds, he had a nice solid frame.  In terms of speed, his forty times ranged somewhere between 4.54 seconds, and 4.44 seconds (at his pro day).  So that checked out fine as well.  With a 0.651 Kangaroo Score, and a 0.187 Agility Score, his other athletic traits ranged from average to slightly above average.  When it came to his Stat Score (our lazy measure of college production), he had a result of 0.311.  Matthews just kept ticking off the boxes on our checklist of requirements, even if he wasn't necessarily blowing us out of the water.

He struck us as a fairly interesting prospect, that we probably would have projected to go somewhere around the 4th or 5th round.  Unfortunately, he wasn't actually selected until the 7th round, which has probably hurt his ability to get playing time.

Now, the interesting thing to us is how he has gradually been showing signs of progress over the last few seasons, despite getting limited playing.  Let's look at some of his results.

Year	Pass Routes Run	Rec Yards	YPRR	Target%	Catch %	YPC
2015	339	662	1.95	17.4	72.9	15.4
2014	111	135	1.21	18.9	57.1	11.3
2013	376	448	1.19	16.4	66.1	10.9
2012	160	151	0.94	11.2	61.1	13.7

While Matthews raw statistical production has never been terribly impressive, we still think he's been an interesting guy to keep an eye on.  As his Catch % would suggest, he generally seems to have been a fairly reliable target, and perhaps even a bit above average.  The main issue has been in getting him targets.  While his Yards Per Route Run (YPRR) results in his first 3 seasons have generally only hovered around the area where we expect to find most team's 3rd or 4th receiver, they have gradually been improving.

It's really his results from 2015, that make you wonder if he might be about the step up to another level.  With a YPRR of 1.95, along with a catch rate of 72.9%, and a YPC of 15.4, you're seeing results that are really quite impressive.   I wouldn't want to get carried away with any of this, but Matthews could be developing into someone who could be a nice secondary receiver for some team.  We also can't underestimate some of the things that might have been holding him back in Miami, including his quarterback, and the team's lack of investment in developing a former 7th round pick.

The neat thing about all of this, is that I would tend to doubt that Matthews would cost very much to acquire.  Since he hasn't crossed the sort of statistical thresholds that tend to draw the eyes of NFL GMs, and also still carries the burden of being a former low draft pick, I wouldn't expect the bidding to get too high.  Maybe a contract that offers around $3 million/year, at most.  His price could end up a tad higher or lower, but regardless, it would be a fairly low risk investment.  If he performs well, continuing on from where he left off in 2015, your team could get a hell of a deal.  If he stumbles and falls, well, the cost of dropping such a contract, and the dead money hits that would go along with it, are really quite minimal.  It strikes me as a nice low risk, potentially high reward situation.

I guess I'll toss in a few odds and ends types of players here as well, since I have nothing else to do while waiting for the psilocybin to kick in.

Maybe it is a product of being in Baltimore, and hearing the locals fret about the looming departure of guard Kelechi Osemele, but I've really been curious about the number of sites that list him as a more desirable free agent than Brandon Brooks.  Admittedly, Reilly and I have had a bit of a man-crush on Brooks for quite a while, so this might be a product of our own biases.  Still, we truly feel that Brooks should be the much more desirable of the two, and someone we could be tempted to spend stupid amounts of money to acquire.

Assessing the performance of offensive linemen generally opens a huge can of worms, so I'll let you judge this on your own, based on whatever sources you trust.  All I can say is, as far as we can tell, Brooks has consistently been a vastly superior guard to Osemele when it comes to pass protection.  We'd also say that Brooks has been superior in terms of run blocking, though Osemele probably comes closer to narrowing the gap in this area.  If you enjoy watching fat men tussle with each other (and who doesn't enjoy that), really look at these two side by side, and tell me that Brooks isn't the better player.

The main thing that seems to be hurting Brooks' stock this year, were the claims that his run blocking started to slip some in the 2015 season.  Personally, I have my doubts about these claims.  It seems more likely to me that this perception come from the Texans having to replace Arian Foster with more humble talents like Chris Polk and Alfred Blue.  People see the running backs getting less yardage, and for some reason they just didn't reach the conclusion that these running backs were as lame as a a three legged mule.  Instead they blamed the line.  Again, maybe this is all just mindless speculation on my part.

There is also the question of the injury risks that come with Osemele versus Brooks.  Over the past 3 seasons Osemele has missed about 27% of his games due to injuries that seem to keep popping up.  Brooks on the other hand, has only been out for 8.3% of his team's games.

If I had to throw a number out there, as to how high I would bid on Brooks, how high would I go?  That's hard to say.  Considering the lack of attention his looming free agent status seems to be garnering in the press, it is hard to say where things will wind up.  Honestly, I think if his price remained under $7 million/year, I'd have a hard time not pursuing him.  Maybe that sounds a bit high to some people.  I really can't say.  Personally, I think he could end up being a good deal even at a price higher than that, since I think he could end up being viewed as one of the best guards in the game today, if people were paying closer attention to Brooks.

I suppose the final looming free agent prospects that I am interested in might be among the league's scattered defensive backs.  I tend to hate these players, as I think they are overpaid, and inconsistent, but a team still requires that you have a few of them.

I'd probably put cornerback Patrick Robinson at the top of the list.  Robinson seems to be mainly treated with apathy, as far as I can tell, and the one year $2 million contract he played for in 2015 doesn't speak too highly of the league's attitude towards him.  In my opinion, he is an above average athlete, who was probably drafted a tad higher than he should have been, leading to unfortunately high expectations.  As far as I can tell, he has probably performed at a respectable level during his career, on some questionable defenses, and could be a nice bargain.  We're looking for a rebound.  Something in the $2-4 million/year range seems like a minimal risk to me.

Then we have the somewhat dreaded cornerback Josh Robinson on our shopping list.  We've been severely disappointed with his play so far in his career, especially since he is about as perfect an athlete as you could find for that position.  Still, we think he was gradually showing signs of improvement in 2015, so a reclamation project might be tempting.  I'm guessing he should be insanely cheap, maybe $1.5 million/year, so there is no real risk in seeing if his career can be revived.

Finally, I will admit to a slightly strange interest in Vikings' backup safety Robert Blanton.  On paper, he has the sorts of athletic traits we like to see at this position, a 1.177 Agility Score to go along with a 0.947 Kangaroo Score, and he seems to have performed to a respectable level in his appearances in 2014.  No, he might not ever become a star, but I suspect he can be quite respectable...and cheap!  Compared to someone like George Iloka, who will probably also hit free agency, I think Blanton could be 90% of the player for maybe 20% of the price.  I mean, how much can Blanton really cost, maybe $1.5 million/year?  I've probably got that under my couch cushions.

I guess there might be a few more players that interest me, at the right price, such as linebacker Vincent Rey, running back Robert Turbin or the perpetually ignored and forgotten defensive tackle Quayshawne Buckley.  In the end, though, I've already spent enough time prattling about the unloved and unappreciated, which just reminds me too much of the cold inattention I receive from my ingrate parents.  So, I guess I'll just pour a drink and have a good cry, much as I suspect many of these players will be doing on March 9th.

Charles Johnson Vs. The World

In 1996, Chris Ofili used elephant dung in the making of his painting The Holy Virgin Mary (which recently sold for $4.6 million).  In 1985, Dr. Emmett Brown made a time machine out of a DeLorean (Did you know that Back To The Future is banned in China for depicting time travel?).  Recently, an Australian teenager plotted to set loose a kangaroo strapped with plastic explosives, as part of ISIS plot to cause mayhem (Awesome?  Well, we have mixed feelings).  Finally, at some point in the late 1990s (For some reason I can't recall the exact date), I made a bong out of Legos.

I guess what I am trying to suggest here is that people sometimes find peculiar ways to utilize the resources they have at their disposal.

In a similar manner, we often have to wonder about the way that NFL teams choose to make use of the talent on their rosters.  While I could rant for days about offensive linemen, and my continued faith in the neglected and potentially misunderstood Eric Kush, that probably isn't a subject that interests many people.  Instead, we will focus today on the wide receiver position, which has a bit more flash to it.

Despite our attempts to try to quantify a player's abilities, and predict NFL success, we always struggle with the fact that we can't guarantee that someone will get an opportunity.  We still believe that Da'Rick Rogers was a legitimate NFL talent.  The statistics that are available from his brief appearances encourage us to believe that he was a superior player to his former Tennessee teammates Cordarelle Patterson and Justin Hunter, whom we had very little faith in.  Unfortunately, NFL coaches seemed to feel that Da'Rick was a bit of an asshole, a consideration our calculations don't really account for.  Skill doesn't trump a winning personality, evidently.

We also still believe that the Jets should have taken Ryan Spadola (who?) a bit more seriously, rather than continuing to give opportunities to Stephen Hill, whom we felt was probably doomed to fail.  While betting on an undrafted white wide receiver from Lehigh might seem a bit foolish, Spadola's pre-season statistics in 2013 were quite encouraging.  At this point, however, he may never escape the depths of a practice squad.  C'est la vie.

These are things that will always be beyond our control.  Still, we wanted to take another look at one of our other long-shot receivers, who is still dancing on the edge of semi-relevance.  So, we thought we would turn our gaze back to the frustrating subject of Vikings' wide receiver Charles Johnson.


Charles Johnson Vs. Mike Wallace

There are limits to how much we want to criticize Vikings' wide receiver Mike Wallace.  After all, he was one our preferred wide receiver prospects in the 2009 NFL Draft.  While he has his strengths and weaknesses, we thought at the time that his chances of success were reasonably good.  It's true, his salary may have eventually ballooned beyond what we feel is reasonable, but that isn't really what we are here to discuss.

Instead, we are mainly interested in the complicated situation that arose when the Vikings traded for him, prior to the 2015 season.  This worried us because of the way in which his arrival seemed poised to interfere with the possible continuing emergence of our other weird prospect Charles Johnson, who was starting to show some signs of life in 2014.

The reason for this concern, was that both players have mostly appeared to thrive in the role of an intermediate-to-deep range receiver.  Wallace wasn't likely to interfere with the short range role of someone like Jarius Wright.  That's simply not a role where Wallace's strengths appear to lie.  Instead, he was most likely to cut into the playing time for Johnson, which would sort of put a crimp in our deranged plans.

What's frustrating about this, is the question of whether Wallace was really a desirable enough acquisition, at this point in his career, to deserve bumping Johnson out of the way.  How much of Wallace's desirability hinged on his past successes, and reputation for being a deep threat?  How much of this reputation was still justifiable?

While judging a receiver based on his average yards per catch (YPC) is a fairly stupid thing to do, it does appear a bit odd how his numbers have steadily declined in this area, especially after the 2011 season.  From 2012 onward, his numbers have been, at best, rather pedestrian.

We can possibly lay some of the blame for this at the feet of quarterbacks like Teddy Bridgewater and Ryan Tannehill, whom he played with from 2013-2015, but that may not explain the entire situation.  Even in 2012, with Roethlisberger throwing the ball, Wallace's numbers already appeared to be slipping.  His usefulness as a deep threat may have already been eroding.

Like I said, judging a receiver based on YPC probably isn't a great idea.  So, let's instead look at the above chart to see his annual Yards Per Pass Route Run (YPRR).  Despite my occasional criticisms of PFF, I think YPRR might be a reasonably useful statistic.  It has its flaws, but is better than some of the alternatives.  It's basically a very simple sort of measure of a receiver's efficiency on a per play basis.  A YPRR over 2, generally suggests that a player was having a rather rare and exceptional year.  A YPRR under 1, might mean that a player is really just on the fringe of being useful.

We should probably mention that we calculate YPRR slightly differently from the folks at PFF, as they throw out certain plays for mysterious unknown reasons, while we don't.  Despite that, the differences in our results are very minor.  I have some nagging issues with YPRR, but that's a subject for another day.

Nonetheless, Wallace's numbers here would suggest that his only really exceptional years might have come in 2010 and 2011.  Beyond that, he was probably playing at a level that we might associate with a team's 2nd or 3rd receiver, which still isn't a bad thing at all, as long as he is being paid in a manner that fits those expectations.  Then we come to his 2015 season with the Vikings, where his numbers really went into the toilet.

The question is, could we have predicted this outcome in 2015?  I can't really say that this is the case.  While there are issues related to the Vikings' offensive system, and the effectiveness of Teddy Bridgewater, I probably wouldn't have expected Wallace's effectiveness to plummet to this degree.  Another year or two of solid but unspectacular production from Wallace probably wasn't an unrealistic thing to bet on.  This sort of rapid decline was probably unforeseeable.

Of course, there is the other question of whether maintaining his plateau of "good, but not great" performances, was something that the Vikings should have been investing in.  By trading with the Dolphins, to acquire Wallace's services, they also had to take on his salary of $9.9 million for 2015 (which goes up to $11.5 million for 2016 and 2017).  It's been quite a while since a salary of that sort was even halfway reasonable for what Wallace delivered on the field, which brings us to the real issue that interests us.  Would the team have been better off continuing to give playing time to Charles Johnson (who had a $510 thousand salary) instead?

I think comparing the statistics for these two players, prior to the 2015 season, is kind of interesting.  While no individual stat can undeniably answer the question of "Who is the better player?", it may at least spark some debate over what factors the team was considering (or not considering), when they made their decision to trade for Wallace.

Let's start by just examining some of their results from the 2014 season, side by side.  We will include their Catch % (the percentage of plays in which they caught the pass, when targeted), Drop % (percentage of passes dropped), YPC (Yards Per Catch), YPT (Yards Per Target), YPRR (Yards Per Route Run) and Target % (percentage of passing plays they were on the field for,  where they were targeted by their quarterback).

2014
Player	Catch%	Drop %	YPC	YPT	YPRR	Target%
M. Wallace	62.03	3.70	12.86	7.98	1.60	21.14
C. Johnson	56.36	1.81	15.35	8.65	1.65	19.09

While there are some differences between these two players, I feel they are at best relatively minor.  When it came to Drop %, YPC, YPT and YPRR, Charles Johnson had the advantage.  For Wallace, he seemed to take the lead when it came to catch rate and percentage of plays where he was targeted.  Personally, we think that the difference in individual catch rate can partially be explained by the depth at which the players caught their passes, since deeper passes tend to be lower probability plays.  That would perhaps work in Johnson's favor to some degree.  We also have to remember that 2014 was effectively Johnson's rookie season, for whatever that is worth.  Regardless, we could spin these numbers quite a bit further, but in the end, the question is fairly simple.  Do you believe there was a significant amount of evidence to separate these two players?

So, as we feared, Mike Wallace's 2015 arrival in Minnesota did appear to have a rather dramatic impact on Charles Johnson's playing time (just 94 passing snaps for Johnson, versus Wallace's 517).  Instead of potentially becoming the team's primary receiver, Johnson turned into a ghost, only being targeted by his team's quarterback in 6 games, and spending most of his time on the bench.  This extremely limited playing time makes a direct comparison of their individual numbers in 2015 a bit more unreliable.  Still, we think the statistics are worth looking at.

2015
Player	Catch%	Drop %	YPC	YPT	YPRR	Target%
M. Wallace	57.97	5.79	12.07	7.00	0.93	13.34
C. Johnson	69.23	0.00	14.11	9.76	1.35	13.82

While we can only speculate on how more playing time would have affected Johnson's numbers, for better or for worse, these results paint a peculiar picture.  In every single category, Johnson appears to have been outperforming Wallace.  Despite that, the team rarely felt it was worth putting Johnson on the field.

None of this is meant to suggest that Johnson would have had a monstrous season if he had played more, because I don't think that is likely.  Still, considering the near parity of their individual Target % results, we could somewhat reasonably propose that Johnson quite likely would have out-produced Wallace in 2015 if given an equal opportunity.  In the end, Wallace finished the season with 40 receptions for 483 yards (when we include the post-season).  If we extrapolate from Johnson's limited 2015 data,  this might have worked out to something like 49.5 receptions for 698 yards if Johnson had been given a similar opportunity, and his other numbers had remained steady.  Of course, this is all a bit speculative.

That would work out to a possible 23.7% improvement in receptions, and a 44.5% improvement in receiving yards, over Wallace's 2015 results.  It would have also put Johnson's productivity into a range that we consider to be slightly above average, relative to most NFL wide receivers, which is all that we are really hoping to find.

Or, perhaps you think Johnson's results from his limited 2015 snaps wouldn't have remained fixed at their current position.  I would actually agree with you on this. Because of the limited sample size of Johnson's snaps this year (again, just 94 passing snaps for Johnson, versus Wallace's 517), it's very hard to say how steady his results would have remained in a larger role.  Personally, I suspect Johnson's 2015 catch rate would have dropped a bit, if he had been a bigger focus of his team's offense.  On the other hand, I think the rate at which Johnson was targeted probably would have risen slightly, if he was serving as his team's primary or secondary receiver, rather than their fourth or fifth option.  If we just averaged out Johnson's 2014 and 2015 results, we might see him with a catch rate of 62.79%, a target percentage of 16.46%, and a YPC of 14.73 yards.  By receiving Wallace's 517 snaps on passing plays (including the post-season), this would result in Johnson possibly generating 53.4 receptions (a 33.4% improvement over Wallace's results) for a total of 787 yards (a 62.9% improvement over Wallace).  Again, this is just speculation, but I don't think these projections are terribly unreasonable.

Or, maybe we are completely nuts.  Perhaps Charles Johnson would have performed as poorly as Mike Wallace.  I certainly can't see any reason to suspect that Johnson would have done any worse than Wallace, but we're open to this possibility.  Johnson still would have had the advantage of costing about 1/19th of Wallace's 2015 salary, as well as retaining the 5th round draft pick that was traded to the Dolphins to acquire Wallace.

I guess what I'm wondering here is, why wasn't Johnson at least worked into the rotation a bit more, considering how poorly Wallace was performing?  It's seems doubtful that he could have done any worse, and most of the numbers would suggest that he might have performed better than Wallace, and at a much lower price.


Charles Johnson Vs. Stefon Diggs

We have no ax to grind when it comes to Stefon Diggs, but we probably have to throw him into this discussion as well.  While Diggs didn't make the cut, when we were putting together our list of 2015 Draft prospects whom we felt had a good chance of becoming successes in the NFL, we're always open to the possibility of someone slipping through the cracks and exceeding our expectations.  These things happen, from time to time.

While we felt that Diggs had too many risks associated with him to merit a draft pick, we can't deny that he did appear to become a productive player.  He also managed to generate a fair bit of hype.  So, we thought we should take a closer look at his 2015 results, in the same categories we just examined for Mike Wallace and Charles Johnson.

2015
Player	Catch%	Drop %	YPC	YPT	YPRR	Target%
S. Diggs.	67.46	2.4	13.32	8.98	1.65	18.44

Now, just for the sake of argument, go back and compare Diggs' 2015 results to Charles Johnson's 2014 results.  That way we are looking at two players, both of whom are effectively playing as rookies, and who both received a respectable amount of playing time.  In the end, I think it is kind of funny how eerily similar their results actually are, with the only notable difference being their catch rate.  Despite that, there seems to be a different set of expectations that some people hold about their individual futures.

Let's take things a bit further though.  While people seem rather optimistic about Stefon Diggs' future, there are some weird issues with his 2015 results which I think are worth commenting on.  In Diggs' first four NFL games, he had 25 receptions for 419 yards, which averages out to a ridiculous 104.75 yards per game.  In his next 10 games, he produced 31 receptions for 327 yards, or 32.7 yards per game.  There is obviously a rather huge difference in these results, so let's look at his results from these two periods of the 2015 season.

	Catch%	Drop %	YPC	YPT	YPRR	Target%
1st 4 games	69.44	2.77	16.76	11.63	3.05	26.27
last 10 games	65.95	2.12	10.54	6.95	1.04	15.01

While some might argue that Diggs' numbers dropped simply because he was being targeted less frequently in those final 10 games, which is true, I don't think that necessarily explains what is happening here.  After all, it is hard to explain this drop in the rate at which he was targeted, unless some other Vikings' receiver was suddenly becoming a more appealing option, or if opponents started to account for Diggs and shut him down.  The other concern for me is the question of why his YPC (a 37.2% drop) and YPT (a 40.3% drop) have plummeted to such a ridiculous degree.

So, what are we supposed to believe that the future holds for Stefon Diggs?  Do we bet on him returning to the shockingly good 3.05 YPRR we saw in his first four games?  Or, do we bet on the larger sample size of his final ten games, and the rather disappointing 1.04 YPRR he displayed there?  The funny thing about this is that many people seem willing to criticize Mike Wallace (deservedly so) for having a disappointing season, while ignoring the fact that for over 70% of the season Diggs' results really weren't significantly better.  Despite these concerns, we wouldn't argue with the Vikings using Diggs as a starting wide receiver.  After all, it's entirely possible that he was one of the team's better options. 

While I have no real stake in how any of this plays out, I'd have to stick to our initial hunch regarding Diggs.  His numbers in college made us quite wary of him, and so far the bulk of his playing time hasn't persuaded us to change our mind about how things will turn out in the long run.  Those results from his final 10 games are probably closer to what we would have expected of him.  We'll have to wait and see what happens next year.


I guess I've been rambling a bit...

Maybe this all seems a bit pointless.

Perhaps it is a bit odd that we would be focused on such a player, whom we admittedly don't feel was likely to enter into the discussion of the league's most productive receivers.  Then again, we have some doubts that anybody was likely to do so, playing in the Vikings offense.  The team's stubborn focus on giving Adrian Peterson the ball, as well as some possible issues with Bridgewater's development, probably aren't ideal factors for a record setting season by a receiver.

While we have admittedly had some hopes in the past that Charles Johnson could emerge as the next late-round or undrafted receiver to earn comparisons to Victor Cruz, Marques Colston, Wes Welker or Rod Smith, it's entirely possible that this will never happen.  Maybe Johnson will just become a good, somewhat above average receiver, which would still be an excellent outcome for a former 7th round draft pick.  Maybe he won't.  Who really knows?

All we can really say is that whatever potential he might possess won't be discovered by having him sit on the bench, while the players ahead of him continue to under-perform.  The possibility that prime years in a potentially talented player's career might be getting squandered somewhat irritates us.  There's really only a small window where these players are likely to shine, after all.

It would be nice to think that all the talented players eventually rise up to gain the attention of their coaches, but we have our doubts about this.  For every Cameron Wake, who goes undrafted and gets bounced to the CFL, only to return to terrorize the NFL, there are probably numerous other players who never get their shot.  The mistakes made in the NFL Draft have far reaching consequences, and those initial impressions that teams form about a player seem difficult to shake.

Think about this for a second.  Wouldn't we all agree that former top 10 draft selection, Matt Leinart, was a rather significant failure?  Yet, we often seem to forget that Leinart still spent 7 seasons in the NFL.  That means that for seven years, somebody was getting bumped off of a team's roster to make room for Leinart.  While the player's getting cut to make room for Leinart likely wouldn't have gone on to stardom, it was still a potential missed opportunity to explore other options.  It was one less chance, or 7,  to look under some rock looking for talent.  The only explanation for these decisions seems to have been "Well, Leinart was a former 1st round pick".  He certainly didn't seem to possess any other real qualifications.  This is why I sometimes hate the NFL Draft, even while I still obsess over it each year.  Draft status simply matters more than it should.

At this point though, my hopes are rapidly diminishing as to whether we'll ever discover the truth about Charles Johnson.  For now, I'll probably just go back to playing with my Legos, or working on my plans for militarized kangaroos.  It might be a more productive use of my time.

The Path of Dalton: Road House Economics

It's quite likely that you have made a horrible mess out of your life.  It happens to most people, so you shouldn't feel too bad.  Maybe you became a doctor, a lawyer, or pursued some other dead-end low wage career that has left you feeling hollow inside.  You are probably wondering where it all went wrong, and the answer undoubtedly lies in having poor role models.

There's really very little I can do to offer you hope.  At this point, most of you are probably too far gone, but there is still a chance to save your children.  Hope still exists for them, which I have discovered through a deep and insightful examination of our society's greatest artistic achievements.  The subtle clues of how to live a meaningful and profitable life have been provided to us all, if only we had paid attention.

Let's just take a moment to consider the 1989 Academy Award winning film Road House.  Beyond it's obvious guidance in the fields of hair spray application and how to rip out another man's throat, there might be some very sound financial advice, just lurking beneath the surface.  This advice might not be applicable to everyone, but if you yearn to breathe free, and live the unfettered life of a rambling, roaming, well-coiffed barroom bouncer, it presents some very exciting possibilities.

Now, you may be thinking that you don't have what it takes for such a lifestyle.  Like most modern "men", you probably have an endless stream of excuses for why you haven't reached the peak masculinity exhibited by this film's main character Dalton.  Let's just give that cowardly attitude a moment of thought.  Do you really believe that you are less deserving of the good things in life than an NYU philosophy student?  Well, that's exactly how Dalton spent his college years, and we all know that philosophy majors are a step below McDonald's fry cooks on the socioeconomic ladder.  Yet Dalton is seen tooling around town in a 1987 Mercedes 560 SEC.  In 1989 that would have been a two year old  car costing $76,380 (or $159,575 in 2015 inflation adjusted dollars).  Not too shabby.  How many philosophy majors do you know who have that kind of cash lying around?

Unfortunately, Dalton wasn't very forthcoming on how he had managed to pull this off.  Even when his doctor (dramatically re-enacted by Kelly Lynch), asked whether he had "Come up with any answers" from his philosophical studies, Dalton played coy.  Whether it was modesty, or a reticence to reveal the golden path to financial success, Dalton wasn't going to confess how he had not only avoided life as a barista, but had managed to thrive.  The one thing he didn't take into account, was that his every action was being recorded, and repeatedly viewed by a sleuthing internet blogger.

DALTON"S SECRETS CAN NOW BE REVEALED!

At the beginning of this fine documentary film, we see the owner of the 'Double Deuce' road house, trying to lure Dalton to come work at his bar.  The incentives Dalton was presented with were as follows:

$5,000 in upfront cash (which we will view as a signing bonus)
$500 per night that he works.
All of Dalton's medical expenses will be covered.

Okay, let's ignore the $5,000 bonus (or $9,570 in inflation adjusted dollars), and the health care coverage.  That's chicken feed.  If Dalton worked just 5 nights a week, 52 weeks a year, that works out to $130,000 per year.  That's in 1989 dollars.  Adjusted for inflation, that would be a yearly salary of $248,820.  Even if the government was hitting Dalton with a 40% tax rate, with some sound investments he could almost certainly retire fairly comfortably by the age of 40 (assuming he started his throat ripping career when he was just out of college).  That strikes me as a fairly attainable life span for a bouncer.

Based on what we know of Dalton, and his free spirited and drifting ways, his finances could really go quite a bit further.  From what we are shown, he has no known family.  Wandering from road house to road house, he only seems to be in town long enough to impregnate the local barmaids before moving on, making child support a non-issue.  Hell, I might be able to argue that he could retire by 35, if the courts can't manage to track him down, which is easily within the time frame that I think his body could still sustain the occasional beatings.

The only real question is how poorly Dalton actually handled his cash, which admittedly is something that brings us back to his purchase of the Mercedes.  I'm kind of torn on this subject, because I am a strong believer in Nazi engineered vehicles, and the possibility that Dalton could have reasonably maintained that car for the next 30 years.  Those cars were built like tanks.  Regardless of my biases, we have no other evidence of frivolous spending, but we do know that he took residence in a barn, which he rented for just $100 per month.  So, his annual rental costs could have been a mere 0.92% of his annual income.  That's rather impressive.

I would also argue that Dalton's pay, upon arriving at the 'Double Deuce', was partly due to his reputation for being able to rip a man's throat out with his bare hands.  Like many legends, there were surely people who doubted the truth of this...umm...skill.  By the time his employment at the 'Double Deuce' had come to an end, Dalton had demonstrated yet another throat ripping, that I suspect would have created further tales which would have circulated among the local populace.  Since criminal charges didn't seem to follow this assault, I have to assume that this would only legitimize the folklore that followed Dalton, and potentially increased the demands for his services, as well as the salary he could demand.  This isn't meant to be viewed as an acceptance of these practices, but merely an acknowledgment of the apparent employment qualifications that are valued in the world of hill-billy road houses.   I'm not sure where salaries top out for bouncers, but I also never would have suspected that a bouncer could earn $130,000 per year.  So, where do we draw the line?  5 verified throat rippings, and a salary of $500,000?  It's very difficult to speculate.

The more thoughtful readers of this blog may have leapt to a rather insightful conclusion, without my assistance.  We have all undoubtedly heard of bartending schools, and while they have their place, I doubt any of us have seen anyone become rich from pursuing this path.  But where are the bouncing schools?  I've certainly never seen one.  The only conclusion I can reach is that the rewards of a successful life for a bouncer are so great, that the path to this life has become rather secretive.  It's sort of like that island in the Caribbean where topless super-models go to engage in dwarf tossing.  You don't hear about it, because you're not traveling in the right social circles.  The one percenters have no interest in letting the plebs in on their fun.  Still, we have to assume that some sort of bouncing school exists, or that there is an apprenticeship program in place.(as exhibited by Dalton's mentor Wade Garret, whose real life is portrayed by Sam Elluitt).

All I can really say is that you should probably stop saving for your children's college fund.  Maybe put them in some Krav Maga classes, and encourage them to start picking fights at a young age.  Save a few bucks, but still manage to reap the rewards further down the road.  It seems like a winning plan to me.

Or, I might be a little drunk.

Flacco: Making It Rain Corrections

In our most recent post, we were looking at the potential ways that a contract renegotiation with Joe Flacco could play out.  We presented 3 different scenarios, which had outcomes that covered Flacco taking a reduced salary to stay with the Ravens, and two possibilities under which it would appear to be favorable for Flacco to force his way off of the team, in order to sign a contract with someone else.  Unfortunately, we had a massive brain-fart when we were doing some of the math that compared the money that Flacco would pocket under these different scenarios.

When comparing the "new money" Flacco would receive in Scenario 2 to Scenario 1, and then comparing the same funds in Scenario 3 to Scenario 1, we repeatedly made the same mistake.  We idiotically forgot that the bonus money would be in Flacco's pocket from day one of signing any of these new contracts.  In the initial posting, we were just summing his cumulative annual salary, over a 2 year span, a 3 year span and a 4 years span, without remembering that this bonus money would be his from the very beginning.  This was very stupid of us.

None of this changes the proposed contracts we were discussing, it simply alters the sections of that post which related to year to year comparisons of how much Joe will receive in these different situations.  The numbers have now been corrected, and currently point even more strongly than before to Scenario 3 being the most advantageous route for Flacco and his agent to take.  Over a 2 year span, Scenario 3 gives Flacco 49.7% more cash.  Over a 3 year span, Scenario 3 gives him 33.3% more cash.  Even in year 4, which Flacco possibly wouldn't reach in the Scenario 1 contract that has him staying with the Ravens, Flacco would be receiving 15.5% more cash by going with Scenario 3. 

We apologize for being morons, but we were on a bit of a caffeine high when we wrote that post.

Flacco: Making It Rain

For anyone who has followed the history of the Baltimore Ravens, it is difficult to not have some appreciation for the contributions of Joe Flacco.  Whatever your opinions of him may be, it is hard to deny that prior to his arrival the quarterbacking in Baltimore could best be described as pathetic.

While local fans probably are a bit too biased towards defending him, and outsiders might underrate him, Reilly and I both agreed that it was important to try to resign him back in 2013.  Of course, Reilly and I also tend to be a bit cheap, but we figured retaining Flacco was still a manageable task.  Well, at least until the Ravens won the Super Bowl, and our initial reaction was something along the lines of "Shit!  They're probably going to pay this idiot $20 million per year now."

Yup, it is fair to say that the contract Flacco received scared the hell out of us.  Unfortunately, many of the locals only looked at his cap hit in the first 3 years of the contract, and downplayed the significance of what was looming in the future.  These optimists are the sort of people who you want to have buying you Christmas gifts on their credit card, or perhaps the market targeted for adjustable rate mortgages.  .

Admittedly, our views on a quarterback's worth probably don't align with those of many other people.  Based on comparing Flacco to his peers (those who aren't operating under the terms of a rookie contract), we think it is obvious that this current contract significantly overpaid him.  When looking at passer rating, touchdown to interception ratios or A/NYA, the best estimate of Flacco's value that we could arrive at was a contract which offered $15.5 million per year.  In some categories, our estimates were even lower.  Regardless, the market has spoken, and our worthless opinions on this subject don't really matter anymore.

This doesn't mean we don't like Flacco.  We do.  He's a perfectly respectable quarterback, and far from the only player we feel is being paid too much.  It just means we would have drawn a different line as to how far we were willing to go to retain him.  Some will say that it is unfair to judge Flacco based purely on his statistical performance, and pin some of the blame for his typically middling output on the talent that surrounds him, or perhaps on his coaches.  That is fine, and possibly even true.  All we are saying is that paying Ferrari money, for a quarterback that you drive like a Honda, is kind of a difficult position to defend.

The likelihood that his current contract is at least somewhat hindering the team from achieving success on the field, seems to be reasonably  likely.  As one individual consumes an ever increasing percentage of the team's cap space, it also becomes more imperative than ever that the team compensate through improved drafting.  We've mentioned before how we think this is also an area where the Ravens have actually been in decline over the past several years.  Combining these salary issues, along with a reduced ability to find cheap young talent, probably explains a fair bit about what has gone wrong with the Ravens 2016 season.

That the Flacco contract was also significantly back-loaded, and gave Joe a ton of leverage on future (current) negotiations was largely overlooked in the past.  Now, the general consensus seems to be that the Ravens will be forced to renegotiate this contract, prior to the start of the 2016 season, in order to free up cap space, and we have some serious doubts/concerns about how this will proceed.


Like the backseat of a Volkswagen?

It is pretty much impossible to accurately guess what a renegotiated contract with Flacco will really look like.  The numbers can be moved around in an almost endless number of ways.  Still, we thought it might be fun to look at some of the complications that could arise in this situation.  We thought we would start by simply laying out the terms of the contract, for the 3 years that still remain on it.

Year	Base Salary	Guaranteed	Cap Hit	Dead Money	Age
2016	$18	$10.55	$28.55	$25.85	31
2017	$20.60	$10.55	$31.15	$15.30	32
2018	$20	$4.75	$24.75	$4.75	33

*If it isn't perfectly obvious, all these numbers are in millions of dollars.

While there is a significant amount of remaining guaranteed money ($25.85 million in total) that is already prorated over these remaining 3 years, that is really only relevant to the Ravens, and the people who manage the team's cap.  From Flacco's perspective, this money is already in his pocket, and like most NFL players has probably been squandered on strippers, cocaine and the upkeep of illegitimate children.  Granted, I am partially basing this assumption solely on what would happen if I was handed several millions of dollars, while still in my twenties.  Now, regardless of what some people may think, Flacco has little reason to let this past guaranteed money factor into his thoughts on future negotiations.  He/I/We have future baby-mamas we want to support, and that is all about future earnings.

The only thing that Flacco should be concerned with is preserving as much of the future base salary payments, that this contract originally "promised" to him.  While the Ravens have obvious motivations to lower Joe's cap hit, especially in the 2016 and 2017 seasons, the only theoretical leverage they have is the threat of cutting Joe, or perhaps begging.  For the most part, this threat of being cut is completely preposterous, and it will be interesting to see how seriously Flacco and his agent view any of this.

For 2016, with a dead money hit of $25.85 million, the leverage is obviously tilted in Flacco's favor.  That means he has every reason to expect to retain the $18 million base salary from that year, at least in some renegotiated form.  There is almost no real savings for the team if they cut Flacco, and even if they did, they would still need to find a replacement for him.  Again, I will say that begging for mercy is the Ravens' best option here.

For 2017, things become slightly more interesting.  The balance between Flacco's cap hit of $31.15 million, versus the dead money hit of $15.3 million is a curious situation.  Sure, the Ravens would save $15.85 million by cutting Joe at this point, but they would again need to address the quarterback position, which is something they have historically been dreadful at.  Who really holds the leverage in this year might be a bit debatable, though we suspect that Flacco would win this game of chicken.  We'd probably continue to bet on Joe retaining his claim on the $20.6 million in base salary from this year, at least in a renegotiated form.

For 2018, Flacco pretty much loses all the leverage he might have formerly possessed, as cutting him with a $4.75 million dead money hit would be laughably easy for the team to absorb.  So, we're going to assume that Flacco has no real expectation of retaining the $20 million in base salary for this year, and it won't really factor into any of the negotiations.

Okey-dokey, it's time to start fiddling with the numbers.  First, we'll throw out the suggestion that Flacco will reduce his 2016 base salary by $15 million.  We will then propose that he reduce his 2017 base salary by $16.6 million.  Since we think Flacco has enough leverage to expect to have earned this money, these won't be real reductions in pay, but the money will be converted into guaranteed money, which will be prorated over the length of his contract.  That would total $31.6 million in new guaranteed money.  Yes, it already sounds insane.

We're going to ignore the possibility of putting this money into future "option bonuses", since we don't think they would necessarily do either side any favors in this negotiation.  Flacco, in particular, would probably be the party most likely to get screwed over by such bonuses, and we see no compelling reason for him to accept that form of payment, at least with the leverage he currently possesses.

Since his current contract only has 3 years remaining on it, prorating this $31.6 million is a bit of a problem, as that would work out to $10.53 million in guaranteed money per year.  That means the team would want to add some more years to Flacco's contract, to allow them to account for this money over a longer period of time (though it would actually go into Flacco's pocket the day he signed his new contract).  The number of years to be added to Flacco's contract is unknowable, but since guaranteed money can only be distributed over a maximum of 5 years, we'll pretend that they will only try to add 2 years to the new contract.

That brings up another complication.  By adding to the number of years that Flacco would be obligated to serve the Ravens, he would probably expect an additional signing bonus, which adds even more guaranteed money to this new contract.  Based on what we are seeing with his peers, who have performed to a similar level, we're going to guess that this would come out to a signing bonus of about $4 million per year that is added to Flacco's original contract, or $8 million in total.  While we find this situation a bit ridiculous, there are actually a number of reasons why we think this could still be a very low estimate, but we'll explain those reasons a bit further on.

Okay, so we now have some sort of basic theory about Flacco agreeing to a 2 year extension, which will take him through the 2020 season, at which point he would be 35 years old.  We also have an estimate of $39.6 million dollars in guaranteed money ($31.6 million from redistributed base salary he was likely to earn, and $8 million in signing bonuses for the extension).  This works out to $7.92 million in new guaranteed money per year, over the course of this 5 year contract.  That makes determining Flacco's numbers for 2016 and 2017 fairly straightforward.  From 2018 onward, we'll just insert a base salary that maintains a fairly steady rate of pay, with some consideration given to Flacco's average annual "new money" payments.  Here's what it looks like so far.

Scenario 1

Year	Base Salary	Old Guar.	New Guar.	Cap Hit	Dead Money	Age
2016	$3	$10.55	$7.92	$21.47	$65.45	31
2017	$4	$10.55	$7.92	$22.47	$46.98	32
2018	$11	$4.75	$7.92	$23.67	$28.51	33
2019	$15		$7.92	$22.92	$15.84	34
2020	$15		$7.92	$22.92	$7.92	35

*Once again, all these numbers are in millions of dollars.

Now, this is all just bullshit speculation on our part, and we will happily admit that predicting how Flacco's contract will be renegotiated is a bit of a fool's errand.  There are many ways in which the numbers can be moved around, and depending on your proximity to Baltimore, you might find these numbers ridiculous for different reasons.  To some, the concept of Flacco carrying an average annual cap hit of $22.69 million will seem outrageous.  To others, proposing that Flacco will be given $39.6 million in guaranteed money will be the sticking point.  Your perception/tolerance of these figures will invariably be affected by whether you were born with one of Ozzie Newsome's mind control implants.

From the Ravens' perspective, this proposal would give them some significant cap relief.  In 2016, it would save them $7.08 million in cap space.  In 2017, it would save them $8.68 million in cap space.  From that point onward, Flacco's numbers would remain fairly stable (if still outrageous), and not present the likelihood of giving Joe such a ridiculous amount of leverage in the future.  In theory, the Ravens could escape this contract just prior to the 2019 season, albeit with some minor discomfort.

The real problem, from our perspective, is that this might be an overly optimistic best case scenario. We think Flacco could actually push for significantly more money, if he chose to do so.  The leverage he possesses over the Ravens shouldn't be underestimated.


Suitor Number 2

Let's explore how things could all go terribly wrong for the Ravens.

Many fans seem to support the idea that Flacco will reduce his base salary to a lower level in order to "take one for the team", or some other sort of deranged nonsense.  The idea here is that by reducing his demands, the team will have more money to spend on other players, allowing Joe to perform better, and making his remaining years more enjoyable.  We recall hearing that unicorns and rainbows are somehow involved in all of this, but we can't swear to that.

What people seem to be forgetting is that this is the same guy who supposedly turned down a deal, prior to his Super Bowl winning season, that would have offered him $16 million per year, in order to bet on himself.  Joe clearly won that bet, and we wouldn't put it past him or Joe Linta (his agent), to do so again.

Despite the generally accepted idea that Flacco's contract will be renegotiated this off-season, we really don't think he has much incentive to do so.  The Ravens have almost nothing they can threaten him with, and he could easily tell them to piss off, with no real consequences.  Now, prior to the 2017 season, he might be more amenable to discussing his contract, but even then, he still retains a great deal of power in these negotiations.  Leverage, not team spirit/loyalty, should be what determines the outcome of this situation.

So, let's pretend that the Ravens open negotiations with Joe prior to 2016.  Let's also pretend that the Ravens are in full kamikaze mode, and refuse to accept that Joe has all the leverage, and actually do decide to cut him.  This is extremely unlikely, but let's roll with this lunacy.

This allows us to speculate on what Flacco could draw as a free agent, which is an additional source of leverage he has over the Ravens.  For this imaginary scenario, we will propose that another team would be willing to offer the 31 year old Flacco a 5 year contract worth $80 million in total.  We'll also speculate that the guaranteed portion of this contract would be $44.8 million, since this would be 56% of the total contract, and relatively in line with the percentages we see being given to quarterbacks who are similar to Flacco.  We'll also pretend that the distribution of funds is perfectly flat over the course of these 5 years.  This is what such a contract might look like.


Scenario 2

Year	Base Salary	Guaranteed	Cap Hit	Dead Money	Age
2016	$7.04	$8.96	$16	$44.8	31
2017	$7.04	$8.96	$16	$35.84	32
2018	$7.04	$8.96	$16	$26.88	33
2019	$7.04	$8.96	$16	$17.92	34
2020	$7.04	$8.96	$16	$8.96	35

Whatever your opinions are of Flacco's abilities as a quarterback, it would be hard to imagine that this wouldn't be a tempting contract to a number of teams.  This imaginary team would be acquiring Flacco for a lower price than what is currently being paid to the likes of piddly old Alex Smith.

It would also present Flacco with some very interesting incentives to depart Baltimore, or at least use the option of departing as leverage.  Despite appearing to be a smaller contract than the previous one we put up in Scenario 1, because of the lower annual cap hits, this actually pays Flacco more actual money.  Let's compare what Joe would be pocketing in "future earnings" with these two different situations.

	Scenario 2			Scenario 1
	Total	Avg.		Total	Avg.
2 yr Income	$58.8	$29.4		$46.6	$23.3
3 yr Income	$65.9	$21.9		$57.6	$19.2
4 yr Income	$72.9	$18.2		$72.6	$18.1

In the first 2 years of these contracts, Scenario 2 (which has Joe leave Baltimore for a new team) would give Flacco $12.2 million in additional earnings, compared to what he would receive in Scenario 1.  In the First 3 years, Scenario 2 would give Flacco $8.3 million in additional earnings over the contract in Scenario 1.  It isn't until we get 4 years into these two contracts that the gap really closes, with just a margin of $100,000 to separate them.

Unfortunately, things are still significantly more complicated than that.  While Scenario 1 seems to close the gap after 4 years, this is unlikely to be the case in reality.  In Scenario 1 (where he stays with the Ravens), Flacco's cap hit of $22.92 million, versus his dead money hit of $15.84 million, gives the Raven's some incentive to force Flacco into another renegotiation.  The Ravens would have some leverage here, since they could save $7.08 million by cutting Flacco prior to his 2019 season.

Scenario 2 doesn't present such problems for Flacco.  He would almost certainly receive every penny promised to him through the first four years of this contract, as it would actually cost this new team $1.92 million more to cut him than keep him at this point in time.

Compared to the contract in Scenario 1, Joe actually maintains more leverage in this contract over a longer period of time.  He additionally makes more money per year, and would theoretically be on a team with more cap space, allowing him to be surrounded by more high priced free agents than the Ravens would be able to provide. 

Ah, but this becomes even more complicated.  As we said before, we think it would be borderline suicidal for the Ravens to cut Flacco prior to the 2016 season, even if Flacco refused to renegotiate.  In 2017, however, there is a slightly increased (but still unlikely) possibility that releasing him would be doable.  If Flacco forced his way off the Ravens' roster in 2017 by still refusing to renegotiate, he could pocket the 2016 $18 million in base salary from his current contract, and then pursue the very same free agent contract we proposed in Scenario 2.  Suddenly his overall earnings would gain an additional boost, making departing the Ravens an even more appealing option.

Scenario 3

Year	Base Salary	Guaranteed	Cap Hit	Dead Money	Age
2016	*$18	*$10.55	*$28.55	*$25.85	31
2017	$7.04	$8.96	$16	$44.8	32
2018	$7.04	$8.96	$16	$35.84	33
2019	$7.04	$8.96	$16	$26.88	34
2020	$7.04	$8.96	$16	$17.92	35
2021	$7.04	$8.96	$16	$8.96	36

*Just remember, in Scenario 3, the 2016 base salary is still being paid by the Ravens, rather than Flacco's "new team".


Let's also again compare how Flacco's earnings compare under these two scenarios, with the "free agent" Scenario 3 receiving the benefit of this additional $18 million from 2016.

	Scenario 3			Scenario 1
	Total	Avg.		Total	Avg.
2 yr Income	$69.8	$34.9		$46.6	$23.3
3 yr Income	$76.8	$26.6		$57.6	$19.2
4 yr Income	$83.9	$20.9		$72.6	$18.1
5 yr Income	$98	$18.1

Now, departing the Ravens after 2016, rather than prior to it, Scenario 3 becomes an even more appealing option.  In the first 2 years of Scenario 3, Flacco would receive $23.2 million more than he would by staying with the Ravens' Scenario 1 offer.  Over the first 3 years, Scenario 3 would pay Flacco $19.2 million more than Scenario 1.   Over the first 4 years, Scenario 3 would pay Flacco $11.3 million more than Scenario 1, but then we get back to the question of how likely Flacco is to actually reach year 4 in Scenario 1, without being forced to renegotiate.  Under these terms, Flacco would also almost certainly reach year 5 of Scenario 3, which is incredibly unlikely in Scenario 1.

So, Scenario 3 seems like the best option for Flacco. It nets him more guaranteed money, and more leverage, over a greater period of time.  It also puts him on a team that has more cap space, or at least one less burdened by their quarterback's annual cap hit.  This also probably gives Joe a better chance of actually winning games in the future, which probably has some modest value to a professional athlete.

We also shouldn't forget that we are only proposing a fictional free agent contract that pays a mere $16 million per year, to illustrate how cheap it could be for a rival to lure Joe away from the Ravens.  It seems quite likely that another team (perhaps the Texans, Browns or Rams) would be willing to pay more per year than the humble amount we are currently suggesting.  If that is so, it only further strengthens Flacco's motivations to not renegotiate, and to try to get out of Baltimore.  Or, at the very least, it allows Flacco apply significant additional pressure to the Ravens, even beyond his looming cap hit numbers.

Regardless of how you may view all of this, you have to admit one thing.  Whatever Flacco's actual value is, if the Ravens are possibly going to be willing to spend around $22.69 million per year to retain him, it seems reasonable to suggest that some other quarterback needy team would be willing to pay 70.5% of that price, which is what our proposed $16 million per year contract works out to.  If someone else is willing to pay that much, the Ravens should in theory lose this negotiation, as well as their quarterback.  Or, possibly, the Ravens will end up paying a price that nobody else in the league feels it is worth paying for Flacco's services.

Either possibility could be a bit depressing.


The Ravens only have themselves to blame. 

Of course, all of this is just spit-balling.  We really have no idea how this will all work out.  Maybe Joe will take a more significant reduction in salary than we think he should.  Reilly and I certainly have no stake in how any of this unfolds.  Joe isn't going to give us a 10% cut of his new contract, and the Ravens definitely don't take our calls.  All we're saying is that we would try to force Joe Flacco out of Baltimore, if we were his agent.  We're cruel and heartless bastards.  The benefits of leaving seem to outweigh the benefits of sticking around, and we see no reason to believe that Flacco should make his decision based on sentiment or generosity (which is all a bunch of hippie drivel).

If Joe chose to take this path, we certainly couldn't judge him harshly for it, or call him greedy.  It would merely be the result of a poorly structured contract, which gave the player way too much leverage, which is entirely the fault of team management.  Some will say that the Ravens were "forced" to resign Flacco, after the team won the Super Bowl in 2012.  We would just say that any decision you feel "forced" to make has a much higher likelihood of being a bad one.

We'll find out soon enough just how bad their next decision will be.