Perhaps A Lobotomy Would Help?

I've been a bit distracted the past two months, folding paper cranes and writing haikus about sheepdogs, but those are the sorts of things which pay the bills.  Regardless, I'm back for the moment for some more deranged ranting about the potential benefits of lobotomizing your favorite NFL team's general manager.

Okay, in the previous post we set the computer up to behave like a bit of an imbecile.  We asked it to pick one player per draft class (from 2004-2013), who was between 245 and 285 pounds, based on their known physical traits, and their number of tackles for a loss in college. We were strictly looking at how productive these players were as pass rushers, and chose to use this range of weights because that is where you typically find the majority of the league's 3-4 outside linebackers and 4-3 defensive ends.  The computer also couldn't pick anyone who was selected before the 3rd round, or anyone who went undrafted.  In the area below, you will find a basic tally of the computer's results for its 10 selections.

	POTGP	GP	GS	Sacks	Sack/POTGP	% GP	% GS
Total	880	635	343	200	0.227	72.15	38.97

POTGP is simply the number of Potential Games Played for a given player.  For example, if a player was selected in the 2011 draft then, by the end of the 2013 season, they could have potentially played in 32 games.  GP is simply the number of games they actually played.  GS is the number of games where they were listed as a starter.  Sack/POTGP is their number of sacks per potential game played.  % GP is the percentage of 'potential games' in which they players appeared.  % GS is the percentage of 'potential games' in which the players were listed as a starter.

I should also mention that the actual average and median draft position of the computer's picks came at the 119th and 115th picks respectively.  Also, the computer's overall Sack/POTGP result of 0.227, would be the equivalent of its typical selection generating 3.632 sacks per 16 game season.

To make some comparisons a bit easier, I will list here the average and median results of the computer's selection, when it came to athletic ability, and the average number of tackles for a loss in a player's final two years in college.  The Kangaroo Score and Agility Score are given in the form of how many standard deviations that a player is away from the average results for someone in their position group.

Computer	Avg. TFL	Kangaroo	Agility
AVG	17	1.067	0.482
MED	16.625	1.279	0.664

Now, we finally get to compare the computer's results to those of a handful of actual NFL teams.  To do this, we'll list every player that these teams selected over the same period of time (2004-2013), who fell into the 245-285 pound weight class.  We also have to remember that we are only examining how these players performed between the time they were drafted, and the end of the 2013 NFL season.  Players who went undrafted, regardless of how they ended up performing, will be left off of these lists.  I won't include all 32 teams here, though I will say that the results we are about to show appear to present a pretty typical picture of most NFL teams.  For the sake of brevity (Ha!), I will just show a handful of teams that I thought were particularly interesting.  If you're curious about some other team's results, feel free to ask, or you can simply do the calculations yourself, since it really isn't that complicated.

We'll start with my favorite team to torment, the Baltimore Ravens.

Player	POTGP	GP	GS	Sacks	Sack/POTGP	% GP	% GS
John Simon	16	7	0	0	0	43.75	0
Courtney Upshaw	32	32	22	3	0.093	100	68.75
Pernell McPhee	48	44	6	9.5	0.197	91.66	12.5
Sergio Kindle	64	3	0	0	0	4.68	0
Paul Kruger	80	67	23	22	0.275	83.75	28.75
Antwan Barnes	112	83	5	25.5	0.227	74.1	4.46
Ryan LaCasse	128	12	0	0	0	9.37	0
Dan Cody	144	2	0	0	0	1.38	0
Roderick Green	160	54	0	12	0.075	33.75	0
Total	784	304	56	72	0.091	38.77	7.14

The Ravens have selected 9 players over this period of time, which is just one player short of what the computer drafted.  The average and median draft position of the Ravens' picks would be the 109th and 129th pick.  So, the Ravens selected almost the same number of players as the computer did, at roughly a similar point in the draft.  Even if we ignore the insane difference in the Ravens' raw sack total compared to the computer, the computer still comes out well ahead in Sack/POTGP.  The Ravens' result of 0.091 would be the equivalent of a player producing 1.456 sacks per 16 game season, well below the computer's result of 3.632.  A total of 4 of the Ravens' picks (44.44%) came from the first two rounds of the draft, where the computer was barred from making a selection.

I suspect Ravens' fans will argue that including players like Dan Cody and Sergio Kindle in this list is a bit unfair, since injuries kept them from getting on the field.  All I can say to that is "Hey, that's life!".  Every team on this list faced an equal risk of this occurring, as did the computer.  I can also say that while both of these players were fairly productive in college, their measured athletic ability makes the likelihood of them becoming exceptional performers somewhat doubtful.  In Cody's case, his 0.187 Kangaroo Score and -0.289 Agility Score paint the picture of a fairly mediocre athlete.  With Kindle, we find he has a 0.203 Kangaroo Score and a -0.533 Agility Score, which again are extremely questionable results.  You can choose to ignore these factors if you wish to, much like the Ravens did, though the whole point of this exercise is to illustrate how that might be a mistake. 

While I have no real problem with the college level statistical production of this group, it seems obvious that actual athletic ability is something the Ravens don't place a lot of value in. Overall, the median athletic ability for their selections was a paltry 0.187 Kangaroo Score, and a -0.289 Agility Score.  This means that the team regularly bets on mediocre athletes, and they appear to get mediocre results.

I also seem to run across a lot of Ravens' fans who continue to express high hopes for Courtney Upshaw, despite his extremely limited contributions as a pass rusher.  We've discussed Upshaw in the past, so we'll cut to the chase.  The main defense that people present for Upshaw, is his supposed quality as a run stopper.  I have no interest in debating this, though I tend to view this argument as an attempt to see the silver lining in a bad situation.  So, here's a simple test, to see if you truly believe that being "good against the run" is as valuable as being a good pass rusher.  How quickly would you trade the one dimensional run stopper, Courtney Upshaw, for a younger but one dimensional pass rusher, like Dwight Freeney?

Now, let's take a look at the Steelers.

Player	POTGP	GP	GS	Sacks	Sack/POTGP	% GP	% GS
Jarvis Jones	16	14	8	1	0.062	87.5	50
Chris Carter	48	29	4	0	0	60.41	8.33
Jason Worilds	64	57	21	19	0.296	89.06	32.81
Bruce Davis	96	15	0	0	0	15.62	0
LaMarr Woodley	112	94	81	57	0.508	83.91	72.32
Shaun Nua	144	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nathaniel Adibi	160	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	640	209	114	77	0.120	32.65	17.81

Compared to many of the other teams I looked at, the Steelers actually selected relatively few players in the weight class we are examining, just 7 in total.  While their combined 77 sacks is well short of the computer's 200, the Steelers actually do better than many teams on a per player basis, with a 0.120 Sack/POTGP.  That would give the typical Steelers' draft pick 1.92 sacks in a sixteen game season, which is better than many other team on this list (though well short the computer's average draft pick which produces 3.632 sacks per season).  The average and median draft positions of the Steelers picks would be the 105th and 88th pick respectively, which is about half a round higher than where the computer made its selections.  A total of 3 of these picks (42.85%) came from the first two rounds of the draft, where the computer was barred from making a pick.

I have no interest in criticizing the Steelers.  After all, they have produced better results than many of the NFL teams we'll be looking at, especially when you consider how few selections they made. Still, similar to the previously mentioned Ravens, they also have shown a relative lack of interest in quantifiable athletic ability.  The results for their median draft pick were a -0.144 Kangaroo Score and a -0.028 Agility Score, which is clearly very average.

It seems worth noting, however, that almost all of their sack production during this period of time came from two players, LaMarr Woodley and Jason Worilds, who were both taken in the 2nd round (James Harrison is excluded because he wasn't selected in the draft).  In case you don't remember, the computer was barred from selecting players who were drafted this highly, so the Steelers had a bit of an advantage in this area.  Despite that, I think we can safely say that the computer would have spotted these potential talents rather easily.  We've discussed Jason Worilds before, so we'll skip that topic, except to note his 0.604 Kangaroo Score and 0.727 Agility Score, as well as an average of 14.75 TFL in college.  As for LaMarr Woodley, his 1.195 Kangaroo Score along with a -0.075 Agility Score would have given him a combined 0.560 Total Score (according to the dumbed down methods the computer was using for this game).  When you factor in the 15.25 tackles for a loss that Woodley averaged in his last two years in college, this would have resulted in the computer giving him a 1st round grade, which is slightly higher than where Woodley was actually selected.  So, once again, exceptional athleticism, and a history of proven production seem to produce the best results.

Oh, and if you are still expecting Jarvis Jones to emerge as the next great Steeler's pass rusher, the computer would like to reiterate its strong doubts about that.

Now let's move on the the Patriots.

Player	POTGP	GP	GS	Sacks	Sack/POTGP	% GP	% GS
Jamie Collins	16	16	8	0	0	100	50
Michael Buchanan	16	15	0	2	0.125	93.75	0
Chandler Jones	32	30	29	17.5	0.546	93.75	90.62
Dont'a Hightower	32	30	27	5	0.156	93.75	84.37
Jake Bequette	32	8	0	0	0	25	0
Markell Carter	48	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jerm. Cunningham	64	38	14	3.5	0.054	59.37	21.87
Brandon Spikes	64	51	39	1	0.015	79.68	60.93
Shawn Crable	96	6	0	0.5	0.005	6.25	0
Justin Rogers	112	32	0	0	0	28.57	0
Jeremy Mincey	128	66	40	20	0.156	51.56	31.25
Ryan Claridge	144	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	784	292	157	49.5	0.063	37.24	20.02

More than almost any team I have looked at so far, the Patriots have selected a lot of players in this weight class, with a total of 12.  Despite the abundance of picks that the Patriots have made, their total number of sacks is a horribly embarrassing 49.5.  Even if we look at a better measuring stick like Sack/POTGP, their result of 0.063, is still laughably bad.  That means their typical player would be producing just 1.008 sacks in a 16 game season.  The average and median draft position of these draft picks would come at the 111th pick and 84th pick respectively, which again, is slightly higher than where the computer made its selections.  A total of 5 of these picks (41.66%) came from the first 2 rounds of the draft, where the computer was prohibited from making a selection.

Now, unlike a number of the teams in this post, the Patriots' results get a bit skewed.  Their apparent preference for larger inside linebackers like Brandon Spikes and Dont'a Hightower, means that some of these players weren't likely to get as many pass rushing opportunities.  Still, even if we were to excuse that, it's hard to say that this would radically improve their overall results.  The median results for their selections were a very slightly above average 0.335 Kangaroo Score and a 0.301 Agility Score.  While these are better results than what we saw from the Ravens and Steelers, it unfortunately coincides with a dip in their typical players number of TFLs in their final two years in college, to a median result of just 10.62 (compared to a more respectable 15.25 for the Ravens, and 15.5 for the Steelers and well below the 16.62 for Team Kangaroo).  Obviously, we prefer prospects with great athletic ability and proven performance..

Their player with the highest Sacks/POTGP result, is Chandler Jones.  With a result of 0.546, that works out to about 8.73 sacks per 16 game season.  When you consider Jones' 0.859 Kangaroo Score, along with a 0.247 Agility Score, you start to see someone with some intriguing athletic ability.  When examining his average number of tackles for a loss, during his final two college seasons, we get a result of 11.25 (though we had to adjust this some since he only played 7 games in his final year at Syracuse).  While the computer wouldn't have given Jones a 1st round grade, he clearly had some intriguing potential.

So, how has a team like the Patriots managed to survive with so many of their draft picks producing such poor results?  Well, they've largely gotten by with a regular supply of mercenary free agent pass rushers.  Let's take a look at some of the players they have brought in to fill the void, during this time period.

Player	Kangaroo	Agility	Avg. TFL
Rob Ninkovich	0.267	1.013	13.25
Andre Carter	1.230	0.577	19.5
Mark Anderson	1.344	0.846	12.5
Derrick Burgess	1.802	N/A	N/A
Adalius Thomas	1.573	-0.306	18

Well, how about that!  They've largely been signing freakishly gifted athletes who were highly productive in college.  While some of these players may not have provided exceptional results to their new team, some decline in performance should probably be expected when you are signing players who are going into their 2nd and 3rd NFL contract.   Still, it's funny to consider that these players are the ones that drew the Patriots eye in free agency, since they largely fit our mold for successful NFL pass rushers.  The only real question is, why don't the Patriots just draft players like this in the first place?  If there is one bit of good news, I do think things could potentially turn out quite well for Jamie Collins.

Let's see what a fairly terrible Falcons' defense has done.

Player	POTGP	GP	GS	Sacks	Sack/POTGP	% GP	% GS
Malliciah Goodman	16	14	1	0	0	87.5	6.25
Stansly Maponga	16	12	0	0	0	75	0
Jon Massaquoi	32	24	4	4	0.125	75	12.5
Cliff Matthews	48	25	0	0	0	52.08	0
Lawrence Sidbury	80	48	0	5	0.062	60	0
Curtis Lofton	96	96	95	7	0.072	100	98.95
Kroy Biermann	96	82	22	16.5	0.171	85.41	22.91
Chauncey Davis	144	102	25	11	0.076	80.83	17.36
Total	528	403	147	43.5	0.082	76.32	27.84

Over this period of time, the Falcons have selected 8 players in this weight class.  The average and median draft position of these picks came at the 139th and 140th pick, which is noticeably lower than where the computer (or any other team on this list) made its selections.  By a fairly large margin, the Falcons selections have produced the lowest number of total sacks, though when we look at Sack/POTGP, they at least manage to rise above the Patriots.  Their result of 0.082 would mean their typical pick produces the equivalent of 1.312 sacks in a 16 game season.

Most of the teams we are examining here were chosen due to their on-the-field success, or reputation for having a good defense.  I chose to include the Falcons for the complete opposite reason.  This isn't to say that there aren't good things about the team, but drafting quality pass rushers hasn't been their strong point during this period of time. 

The combination of making slightly fewer picks than the other teams, as well as making them later in the draft, suggests the Falcons really haven't viewed finding a pass rusher as much of a priority.  I can also say that the selections they did make almost invariably lacked the combination of athletic ability and college production that would have made them intriguing targets, in the eye's of the computer.  The median results for these selections were a 0.041 Kangaroo Score a -0.472 Agility Score, which obviously isn't anything to get excited about.  When you also consider their typical players poor median result of just 10 TFLs in their final two college seasons, success seemed quite unlikely.  Hey, that's their choice, and none of my business.  All I can say is that any complaints people might have about a poor pass rush were probably entirely foreseeable.

As one final note, I realize that Falcons' fans might object to Curtis Lofton being included in this list, since he clearly wasn't intended to be a pass rusher.  In the end though, he fell into the weight class that we had selected, so we couldn't exclude him.  If it makes any difference, just be glad we didn't include the Falcons' incredibly disappointing selection of Jamaal Anderson, with the 8th overall pick in 2007.  Anderson weighed 288 pounds at the combine, which excluded him from this list, and actually slightly improved the overall picture for the Falcons.  In the end, I think that sort of balances out including Lofton.


Finally, let's take a look at the Seahawks' defense.

Player	POTGP	GP	GS	Sacks	Sack/POTGP	% GP	% GS
Ty Powell	16	5	0	0	0	31.25	0
Bruce Irvin	32	28	12	10	0.312	87.5	37.5
Greg Scruggs	32	11	0	2	0.062	34.37	0
K.J. Wright	48	44	40	4.5	0.093	91.66	83.33
Aaron Curry	80	48	39	5.5	0.068	60	48.75
Nick Reed	80	26	0	1	0.012	32.5	0
Lawrence Jackson	96	69	24	19.5	0.203	71.87	25
Baraka Atkins	112	21	0	2	0.017	18.75	0
Darryl Tapp	128	114	35	25	0.195	89.06	27.34
Jeb Huckeba	144	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	768	366	150	69.5	0.090	47.65	19.53

During this period of time the Seahawks have selected a total of 10 players in the weight class we are examining, the same as the computer.  The average and median draft position of these picks came at the 119th and 109th picks respectively, which is roughly the same area as where the computer and most of these other teams made their selections.  Their Sack/POTGP result of 0.090 would suggest that their typical draft pick produces about 1.44 sacks per 16 game season.  A total of 4 of these selections (40%) were chosen in the first two rounds of the draft, where the computer was barred from making a pick.

Despite the solid reputation of the Seahawks defense, their ability to successfully draft pass rushers is rather average to slightly below average, compared to these other teams.  Lawrence Jackson, actually ends up being credited with 28.05% of the sacks produced by Seahawks draft picks, though for 2/3 of these sacks Jackson was on another team, as he was only a Seahawk for his first 2 seasons.  That leaves only the somewhat mediocre Darryl Tapp and Bruce Irvin as the most productive pass rushers to be selected by the team during this period of time.

Again, the reasons for this apparent failure seem a bit obvious.  The median results for these selections would be a -0.007 Kangaroo Score and a 0.172 Agility Score, along with 13.5 TFLs in their final two college seasons.  Those are rather uninspiring results, and not surprisingly they produced uninspiring outcomes.

To fill this pass rushing void, the Seahawks have had to look outside the draft, similar to the Patriots.  In free agency they acquired Cliff Avril (0.287 Kangaroo Score and a 0.215 Agility Score), who was probably just a slightly above average athlete, though he did average 15 tackles for a loss in his final two years in college, which is quite good.  They also managed to pick up Michael Bennett as an undrafted free agent in 2009, and while his average of 9 tackles for a loss in college was fairly pedestrian, his 0.837 Kangaroo Score suggested some reasonable athletic potential (we don't have the data to calculate his Agility Score, unfortunately).  They also traded the previously mentioned Darryl Tapp, for the enigmatic Chris Clemons, who's eventual successes I admittedly have no real explanation for. 

Let's wrap this up...

I realize that only listing the results for 5 different teams may seem like I have been cherry picking the data a bit.  On the other hand, I tend to be a bit long-winded, and I doubt anyone would make it through a post where I did this for every single team.  All I can really say is, these teams seemed to do a good job of illustrating my overall point, and really appeared to capture the general problems most teams have in selecting pass rushers.  These teams, for the most part, are the norm.

That isn't to say that there aren't teams who have done significantly better.  There are.  The Giants, the Rams, the Titans, and a few others have done quite a bit better at selecting these sorts of players, though still quite a bit short of the computer's theoretical results.  Unfortunately, examining the methods to their success aren't that interesting, as their "hits" typically seem to be the very sort of players that the computer would approve of, the highly athletic freak who was productive in college.

Perhaps the most interesting team I looked at was the Kansas City Chiefs, which was the only team to slightly surpass the computer's results.  The combination of selections like Jared Allen, Tamba Hali, and Justin Houston makes up a rather intimidating group of pass rushers.  Still, with the possible exception of Tamba Hali, these players also fit the computer's mold for successful players, so I really don't see much for us to learn here, beyond what we already suspected.  The Chiefs have simply done a good job.

I'm sure some other people will criticize the amount of attention that I give to a player's ability to generate sacks.  To some extent, I suppose that is fair.  Almost any statistical category can be a bit overrated.  Despite that, I think it is interesting that even if we look beyond sack production, the computer's imaginary picks are still crushing pretty much everyone when it come to %GP and % GS.  So, when we simply consider a player's ability to get on the field and play, the computer is doing a much better job there as well.

While some might suspect that the computer had the advantage of hindsight, which is always 20/20, you have to remember that the computer made its selections based only on very basic pieces of data that would have been freely available at the time, so it really had no advantage in this sense.  You also have to remember the huge advantage that these NFL teams had, simply by being permitted to select players in the first two rounds of the draft, while the computer was prohibited from doing the same.  How much more lopsided do you suspect the computer's results would have been if this restriction had been lifted?

In the end, you can never really eliminate the risk that a player will be a failure.  Making any sort of guarantee about how following the path I proposed will assure success would be incredibly stupid.  The only real point that I am trying to convey is that, perhaps, if general managers resigned themselves to the likelihood that their instincts for identifying talented players were largely nonsensical beliefs manufactured by their egos, and instead based their decisions on measurable data, they probably couldn't do any worse, and quite possibly would actually improve (I suspect significantly).  When you really consider their histories of repeated failures, what is the real risk?

Arthur Brown vs. Lavonte David

I have to admit to being a bit excited to see what will become of Arthur Brown, the MLB that the Ravens traded up to select with the 56th pick in the 2013 draft.  As I've mentioned before, I'm kind of betting against Arthur Brown, but I have no real ax to grind on this issue, and wish him the best of luck.  Still, the numbers upon which I base most of my hunches suggest that it is reasonable to be wary of Brown.

When I wrote about Paul Worrilow, I discussed how predicting the success of middle linebackers is a bit more difficult than when we look at other positions on the defense.  This position, as well as safeties, can be used in so many different ways, which makes ruling out success completely a bit difficult.  They can drop into coverage, run sideline to sideline, or blitz the QB, and as long as they can do at least one of these things adequately, they'll continue to have a job.  The truly exceptional MLB can do all three of these things at a high level, but such players are so rare that you generally have to content yourself with someone a bit more limited.  In general, I would say that there is maybe one full service MLB in every draft class, and they tend to go in the first two rounds, because they are fairly obvious talents.  Unfortunately, the 2013 draft class had very little to offer (in the eyes of the computer) in terms of obvious high end MLB talent (at least among players projected to go in the first few rounds). The computer felt that many of the prospects being pushed into the first two rounds, were more a product of a weak draft class, rather than exceptional talents.

I don't think people are expecting Brown to meet the standards of a young Ray Lewis.  The fans probably aren't that crazy.  Fortunately, Lewis' steady decline in the last few years should make the transition significantly less glaring.  Hooray for lower standards!  Beyond that, there is also the high probability that Arthur Brown will end up starting, even if he isn't particularly great, simply due to a lack of options.  The reason this bothers me, is that I think people will end up viewing his starter status too optimistically, and overstate the grandness of any play he ends up making (sort of like people did with Courtney Upshaw this past year).  It's not that I can't appreciate the optimism of the fans, but people tend to treat all draft picks, particularly the high ones, as if they are going to be future stars...until the truth becomes unavoidable.  Then we just move on to our next infatuation.

Again, none of what I'm saying should be read as a statement saying "Arthur Brown can't possibly succeed".  I'm just trying to encourage a more cautious approach to appraising him.  While laying out a precise set of requirements for a high end MLB is a bit complicated, there are some physical and statistical thresholds that you don't tend to see the best of the best falling below.  Just taking a quick look at some of the recent draft classes, we can see some rough patterns amongst the more well known and currently productive MLBs.  As always, the Kangaroo and Agility scores are given in terms of how many standard deviations that a player is above or below the average result for his position group.

Player                                Year      40 time    Avg. TFL      Kangaroo    Agility Score

Arthur Brown	2013	4.67	8.25	-0.869	0.441
Luke Kuechly	2012	4.58	11.25	0.303	1.256
Mychal Kendricks	2012	4.44	14.75	0.574	1.524
Bobby Wagner	2012	4.46	9.75	0.951	0.466
Lavonte David	2012	4.57	14	-0.547	0.285
Akeem Ayers	2011	4.70	12.25	-0.006	0.293
Sean Weatherspoon	2010	4.62	16.5	0.422	0.401
Sean Lee	2010	4.72	10.75	-0.219	1.203
Brian Cushing	2009	4.64	6.5	-0.219	1.133
James Laurinaitis	2009	4.76	7.75	-0.723	0.904
Jerod Mayo	2008	4.54	10.25	0.142	0.034
Curtis Lofton	2008	4.79	8.25	-1.333	-1.445
Patrick Willis	2007	4.51	10.5	0.217	-0.282
Lawrence Timmons	2007	4.66	10.75	-0.481	0.702
Paul Posluszny	2007	4.70	10.5	-0.406	0.996
AJ Hawk	2006	4.59	12.5	0.421	1.891
DeMeco Ryans	2006	4.65	9.5	0.463	0.569
Derrick Johnson	2005	4.52	19.5	0.070	1.223
Jonathan Vilma	2004	4.61	N/A	-0.376	1.516
Karlos Dansby	2004	4.58	11.5	-0.059	-0.763
Nick Barnett	2003	4.67	13.5	-0.451	1.212
Avg. Results		4.61	11.42	-0.062	0.655

In some cases, such as with Lavonte David, Akeem Ayers, and Sean Weatherspoon, I included players who are currently 4-3 outside linebackers.  This was either due to a shortage of plausible, and successful, middle linebacker prospects from their draft class, or simply because I think that projecting them to the inside isn't that far fetched.  You can make whatever you wish to of this decision.  However you choose to look at it, this is, I feel, a reasonable representation of the most highly acclaimed and highly drafted MLBs from the past few years, minus a handful of players for whom there isn't sufficient data.

If the Kangaroo scores seem a bit lower in general, this is because these players are graded with all of the OLBs and defensive ends (generally the cutoff point is 275#), who throw off the curve for the MLBs.  The average results for middle linebackers is probably closer to -0.800 (for now, use that as the baseline for judging these Kangaroo Scores).  If anyone is curious, the average Kangaroo Score for the last 17 Pro Bowl or All Pro MLBs would be around -0.362.  These same 17 Pro Bowl/All Pro MLBs averaged 0.633 on the Agility Score.

So, what do we see when we look at Arthur Brown in comparison to his peers?  Well, first of all, his 40 time is merely okay, and slightly below the average result of his peers in this list, though this is hardly a huge concern.  Secondly, in terms of his Kangaroo Score, he performed worse than anyone on this list, except for Curtis Lofton, who is a bit of an anomaly.  Excluding Lofton, only James Laurinitis came close to Arthur Brown's score of -0.869.  Generally, this would suggest a low probability that a MLB would generate much pressure as a blitzer.  Still, this is not necessarily the end of the world.  Thirdly, we come to Arthur Brown's Agility Score of 0.441, where he did better, though still blow the overall average for the group.  So, this would predict he has some ability to drop into coverage, but still doesn't suggest anything exceptional.

Among the 8 players who had more mundane or average agility scores, let's say below 0.500, most compensated by having improved Kangaroo Scores.  Excluding Curtis Lofton, who I have no explanation for, only Lavonte David remains among these 8, as appearing to be significantly below average in terms of his explosiveness, while simultaneously just okay in terms of agility.  It is for this reason that I included Lavonte David on this list in the first place, despite the fact that he is currently playing as an outside linebacker.  I'll get to that comparison in a second.

For a player whose reputation seems to largely hang upon his alleged athletic ability and speed, Brown certainly doesn't seem to demonstrate this when tested.  Except for a moderately above average Agility Score, his results are in the average to poor range.  Still, I can accept the possibility that he might have just had a bad day at the combine.  It's his on the field results that matter, correct?

As far as the player's Avg. TFL (the average number of tackles for a loss that they generated in the last two years in college), Arthur Brown is again somewhat below average.  You might think that this doesn't matter, and only relates to their pass rushing ability, but I feel differently.  Even if a player isn't generating a significant number of sacks, I think their Avg. TFL number says something about the awareness/decisiveness/aggressiveness with which they are attacking the play, rather than just waiting for it to come to them.  While it is certainly true that the teams they played on can influence these stats, I wouldn't be thrilled with seeing a player measure up poorly in this area. 

As I said, I wanted to make a comparison between Arthur Brown and Lavonte David.  I find this comparison particularly interesting, because I've actually been a fan of Lavonte David for some time now, despite his rather pedestrian measurables.  During the 2012 draft, the computer suggested that there were 4 players who were plausible candidates to become significant inside linebackers Kuechly, Wagner, Kendricks, and David.  So far, they all seem to be doing quite well for themselves. For the most part, I ignored Kuechly, since it was obvious he would be taken before the Ravens would be making their pick.  This left me with just three prospects.  Despite the fact that Kendricks and Wagner scored better, I couldn't escape the fact that Lavonte David was the player I had the most fun watching.  While his combine numbers were just in the acceptable range, his exceptional college stats kept him on my radar.  I still believe that the physically superior player, with proven production, tends to be the safer bet, but Lavonte David drew my eye, and it wasn't as if he did terribly, as far as his measurables were concerned. 

To keep this a fair comparison, let's just compare Arthur Brown's statistical production to that of Lavonte David and the enigmatic Curtis Lofton.  We'll just look at the results from their final two year in college.

Player	TKL	TFL	Sack	PBU	INT	FF
Arthur Brown 1	100	7	1	4	2	0
Arthur Brown 2	101	9.5	2	2	1	0
Lavonte David 1	133	13	5.5	2	2	3
Lavonte David 2	152	15	6	10	0	0
Curtis Lofton 1	157	10.5	1	5	3	4
Curtis Lofton 2 (4 games)	37	4.5	0	0	0	1

Despite all three players being 2nd round picks (Arthur Brown 56th overall, Lavonte David 58th overall, and Curtis Lofton 37th overall), their stat sheets seem to tell an odd story.  For all of his acclaim, Brown doesn't seem to have produced terribly remarkable statistics in any category.  He forced no fumbles.  Brown's number of passes broken up, and interceptions, were decent, but hardly exceptional.  This seems peculiar considering that his coverage ability is allegedly one of his strengths.  His total number of tackles, and TFLs, paled in comparison to the other two (Lofton was on pace for 111 tackles and 13.5 TFL in his junior year, though whether he would have reached those marks is debatable), suggesting less of a presence against the run.  In the end, Brown's stats still appear to be good, but not so stunning that it would make me overlook his mediocre average athletic ability, the way I might for the much more accomplished Lavonte David.

Should I really judge a player off of his stat sheet?  Probably not.  The situations that a player finds himself in do have an impact on these numbers.  Still, I can't deny that I am a sucker for a player with lots of numbers after his name. 

While Curtis Lofton might seem like a reasonable example for why you could ignore athletic measurables, I don't think that is really the case.  According to Pro Football Focus, Lofton has a terrible career rating in terms of his pass coverage ability, which would correspond with his poor Agility Score.  Similarly, he has had a rather poor pass rusher rating from them, which I believe could relate to his bad Kangaroo Score (though agility plays a role in this too).  This hasn't prevented him from becoming a good run stopper, but it does make him a fairly one dimensional player.

I can't predict how things will turn out for Arthur Brown.  All I can say is that for where he was selected, I would be looking for more reassuring signs of athletic or statistical dominance.  If Brown turns out to be just an average to decent middle linebacker, as his numbers would suggest, that is still worth something, though I would argue, not a 2nd round pick (as well as the additional 5th round and 6th round picks it took to trade up).  If he turns out to be great, that's excellent.  I just feel that the argument for taking him isn't as clear cut as some people make it out to be.

Flacco could be in deep trouble

I like Joe Flacco.  To many local Ravens fans, I probably don't like him enough though.  I'm not screaming from the rooftops about him being a top five quarterback.  I'm not predicting a return to the Super Bowl.  I didn't collapse in exhausted relief when he resigned with the team.  Still, I would say that I like having him as my home team's quarterback.  Despite my appreciation for what he can do, I think he could be headed for some trouble, and the alarm bells really started to ring when I heard of the Dennis Pitta injury.

After years of incompetent quarterback play, my team finally had someone who can actually play the position.  Flacco surprised me, after years of watching the likes of Kyle Boller, Anthony Wright, and Jeff Blake.  Did I think that Flacco deserved to have his name mentioned among the top QBs of his time?  No, not really, not yet.  While he clearly has some skills, there were still too many people making excuses for him (it was all Cameron's fault!), to say that he was one of those rare individuals who could carry a team on his own.  Wondering if Flacco would become the next Rodgers, Manning, Brady or Brees, has never been a huge concern for me.  If he reached that level, great.  If he didn't, well, that's okay too.  Building the talent up around your QB, to get the most out of them, can work too (hmm, Eli?).  Unfortunately, things probably aren't really falling into place for Flacco right now.

Do you remember when Flacco was throwing passes to Derrick Mason?  It was one eight yard comeback route after another.  Over and over again.  It never stopped.  Mason was getting near the end of the road, but could still run that one route effectively enough to get open, and give Joe a place to dump the ball off if he was in trouble.  You could count on him.  When the team figured that time was running out for Mason, and that he was probably a bit limited in what he could continue to do, they traded for Anquan Boldin (again, a receiver that they didn't draft, since they don't know how to do so at this position).  Now, Anquan wasn't quite like Mason, but he still provided a nice security blanket for Joe to throw to, and despite it becoming quite apparent that Boldin was slowing down and couldn't get much separation, Joe took advantage of Boldin's reliable hands quite frequently.  Outside of those two receivers, who else has been a reliable option to go to, if Joe was feeling pressure?  Well, that would be Ray Rice, and everyone knows how often Joe throws to him.

Sometimes people talk about checkdown passes a bit too negatively, as if there is something cowardly about not taking every opportunity to fling the ball down the field.  Personally, I think they're great, and believe that finding someone who can provide that reliable outlet for a QB, is often a bit harder to find than an overrated deep threat.  Years of watching Travis Taylor cringe before trying to catch a short pass, which he inevitably dropped, probably influenced my opinion of this.  Taylor seemed to do much better though, when running deep, where he was less likely to get leveled the second he caught the ball (even there he still wasn't great).  Catching short passes seems to take guts, and seems like a surefire way to become your QB's best friend.

So, the Ravens trade away Anquan Boldin for a 6th round pick.  Honestly, I had no problem with this, but I based this on the assumption that the team would seek a replacement of some sort.  Then it seemed to dawn on everyone that Dennis Pitta would take over this role of catching relatively short passes and going across the middle.  Yes!  I was thrilled with this possibility.  After watching the team slowly acknowledge the fact that Pitta was obviously better than Ed Dickson, he was primed to explode!  Unfortunately it was his hip that exploded, in one of the first days of training camp.

So, what is the current picture?  The Ravens have two starting receivers in Torrey Smith and Jacoby Jones, who have mostly been successful as deep threats, and otherwise somewhat inconsistent.  Jacoby is entering his 7th NFL season, and his best year produced only 562 yards for a team (Texans) that let him walk despite being desperate to find a second receiver.  It wouldn't have even cost them much to hold onto him, it that means anything.  Expecting him to suddenly blossom, seems unlikely at this point.  Torrey Smith, who I do like, has also mainly been a deep threat, and has similarly struggled to become much of a presence in the short passing game.  Coming out of college, there was some criticism of his hands and route running, but in his current role this hasn't been a huge issue.  Torrey's measurables from the combine suggest he could be good at running shorter routes, because of his excellent agility (0.805 Agility Score) and explosiveness (0.891 Kangaroo Score), but he hasn't demonstrated this yet.  If there is one area that might cause some concern that Torrey might not become more well rounded, it could be his tiny 8 5/8" hands.  Either way, neither has proven capable of playing this role yet, so expecting it to just happen suddenly is probably a bit overly optimistic.  Beyond these two receivers, you get into wild speculation about Tandon Doss (hmm, nothing happening there) and the 7th round  rookie, Aaron Mellette.

If your receivers are mainly running fairly deep routes, well that means your line is generally going to have to protect the QB for a longer time, correct?  It does take longer to run twenty or so yards, than ten, right?  Unfortunately the Ravens line is a bit questionable.  Yanda is the clear star, and he is starting training camp on the physically unable to perform list.  After Yanda, things begin to go downhill.  Osemele appears to be developing fairly well, but it's still a bit too early to be sure.  We have no idea who the center will be, though I think things will go better if Shipley starts over the more likely option of Gradkowski.  Our tackles are either erratic and overrated (Oher), or obese blobs like McKinnie, who has shall we say "issues" with maintaining interest and focus (though he does have strippers to pay, so that may provide some motivation).  If I am being generous, I would describe the line as average, and that assumes they live up to their potential.  Expecting a high degree of dominance from this group, seems a bit unlikely at this point.

So, Joe's receiving options probably require and extra second or two to get open (for longer range passes that generally have a lower completion percentage), and a line that probably needs him to get the ball out fairly quickly.  Yes, there is still the option of dumping the ball off to Ray Rice, but with the rest of the passing game appearing to be less potent, you would think that defenses could clamp down on Rice a bit more tightly.

While I didn't expect the 2013 Ravens to have a high flying offense, I thought there were enough promising signs of improvement on the defense to allow Joe to play a low key and cautious game.  With the loss of Pitta, I think an unfortunate domino effect occurs.  First, without a reliable short range option, what does Flacco do when he is under pressure?  It seems likely that his two options are to take a sack, or fling the ball up and pray, in which case his completion percentage would probably go down (from an already average result of 59.7% in 2012, and an even lower 57.9% in his much discussed playoff run), and his interceptions would go up (though he has usually been good in this department).

Considering the increased expectations (which are probably a bit unreasonable)that come with his new contract, fans could get a bit surly.  Even when things were going fairly smoothly, Flacco was only throwing for an average of 3,665 yards per year during the last 4 seasons, when other QBs were routinely throwing for over 4,000.  In 2012, 11 QBs managed to reach this mark, with Flacco coming in at the 14th spot.  In 2011, 10 QBs reached 4,000 yards, and Flacco finished in 12th place.  As far as touchdowns go, Joe similarly came in at the 15th and 13th spot.  Again, rather average results.  I'm not saying this to pick on Flacco, but to expect a move up the rankings, as his surrounding talent weakens, seems unlikely.  You could argue that such stats don't really matter, but I think there will be a lot of people, even amongst the team's management, who will be scrutinizing these numbers now that they are paying so much for them.

Another issue relating to his contract, is the way that it is structured.  While I could criticize how much the team paid him (yup, I think he was paid too much), I am more concerned with how they divided up the payments.  As it stands, the contract is somewhat back-loaded, and will need to be restructured after the 2015 season (after which his cap hit jumps from 14.5 to 28.5 million dollars).  For the moment I'll ignore the fact that the team will have very little leverage at that point to get Joe to take a lower salary.  The relevant point is that it is set up for the team to theoretically win within the next three seasons.  If we begin to accept that this season will probably be disappointing, then 1/3 of that window of opportunity is already wasted. 

So, what is the team going to do?  Well, they haven't proven to be terribly good at drafting or developing wide receivers, so I suspect there is a good chance they will make a foolish trade or free agent acquisition, as they have done in the past to address the receiver position (Please don't sign Brandon Lloyd! Please don't sign Brandon Lloyd!).  They currently have about 3.5 million dollars in cap space, though there appears to be little available in terms of free agents.  Getting back on the "pay an aging possession receiver more than he is probably worth" merry-go-round, probably isn't a good idea anyway.  In the meantime, I have to suspect that the team will try to focus on the running game.  There was already talk about Bernard Pierce getting more carries, but if the passing game takes a serious step backwards, this might become even more of a reality.  I don't know if relying on the running game, and a hopefully resurgent defense, will be enough, particularly in this age of explosive aerial attacks, but it seems like their only choice.  Grind it out.  Try to avoid making mistakes.  Hope for the best.  Welcome to the 2003 Ravens!

This also leaves the team in a peculiar situation when it comes to Dennis Pitta.  He is a talented guy, and will be a free agent after this season.  Can you resign him, and hope he recovers from the injury?  Or, do you end up having to let him walk (limp?) out the door on his way to another team.  I'm just disappointed that I won't get to see what I thought could be a very good season by a young and emerging talent, who may never be the same again.

Courtney Upshaw: He fell to us!

This is probably going to come off a bit worse than I would like it too, but I get extra surly when it is my home team, the Ravens, that are making potentially bad decisions.  Recently, they seem to have been making these questionable decisions more frequently, in my opinion, but people overlook them because of the team's relatively strong history of drafting well.  "In Oz we trust", the fans say.  Well, I'm not entirely comfortable with that sort of blind faith, though I will say that Ozzie Newsome does have his strong points.  His recent drafting just isn't one of them.

During the 2012 draft, I think I finally lost the last bit of my confidence in what the team was doing.  With the 29th pick in the 1st round, the Ravens agreed to trade back six spaces, exchanging picks with the Minnesota Vikings.  I was actually quite pleased with this move, since I'm always a fan of trading back, and I also felt that the talent in the draft was fairly deep.  The players who were generally expected to go around the 29th pick, that were still available, also weren't that enticing.  Mainly, I was happy because I thought this eliminated the possibility that we would draft Courtney Upshaw, whom I felt was a disaster waiting to happen, and someone many people expected that we would take if given a chance.  Ozzie had wisely passed on Upshaw, and now some other foolish team would end up taking him!  Well, that didn't exactly work out the way I had hoped.  At the 35th pick Upshaw was still available, and this time the Ravens did select him, while I wept like a little girl.

Now different people will have different views of this situation.  Fans are generally going to want to see the positive side of things (unless they live in Jacksonville where they are probably used to having scorn for their GM).  Locals talked about how Upshaw "fell to us", since he was projected to go in the early-to-mid first round.  ESPN talking heads discussed how the Ravens had done it again, and had top tier talent fall into their lap.  There was surprisingly little thought given to why Courtney Upshaw had fallen so far from where he was originally expected to be taken.

The reputation that the Ravens' organization had built from 1996 though 2006 probably earned them the right to be given the benefit of the doubt.  In that time, their first round picks had almost always turned out to be quite successful, even when picking fairly late in the first round.  From 2007 onward, the quality of the selections has been a bit more debatable.  Ben Grubbs, in 2007, was a relatively low risk, low reward type of pick.  People may want to debate this, but I feel that the Ravens' willingness to let him go while retaining Marshal Yanda (who measures up much better athletically, despite being taken two rounds later) tells you something.  In 2008, there was the Flacco pick, which I really want to avoid discussing.  I like Flacco, but I don't think the hometown hype is entirely justified.  In 2009, they selected Michael Oher, who so far appears to be serviceable at best, but not exceptional.  In 2010, the Ravens traded out of the first, and picked Sergio Kindle, who I suspect would have been a flop even if he hadn't pulled a Humpty Dumpty.  2011 saw them taking Jimmy "Purple Drank" Smith, who has failed to do anything much in his first two years, though he probably has more potential than these other selections.  Then we have Courtney Upshaw in 2012, who I will try to explain in a minute.

Now, Oher, Kindle, Smith and Upshaw do all fit the description of players that people thought were talented, but who fell in the draft for various, often unexplained reasons.  They were all discussed as players who could have easily gone at least 15 spots ahead of where they eventually landed, and have all failed to develop into anything exceptional on the field, at least so far.  I have expressed before, how I feel taking offensive guards in the first round is an easy way for a GM to make a seemingly "safe" pick, since the position doesn't draw the same sort of attention or scrutiny.  Taking players that were universally praised, long after they were expected to be taken, might also insulate a GM from some criticism when things don't work out.  If the player fails, there will always be the defense that "Hey, everybody else thought this player would be good too, so how can you blame me?"  This is certainly a safer approach to take than going out on a limb for a player that you think will be great, but whom the mainstream hasn't stamped with their seal of approval.  Even if making a more aggressive pick panned out, you might be faced with criticism for making a "reach" for the player.  There is no win-win situation for the GM, unless you think they really don't care what their peers think of what they are doing.  Personally, I don't believe they are immune to this sort of pressure, and while I may criticize them, it isn't without some measure of sympathy.

So, now we finally come to the question of Courtney Upshaw, and why I dreaded his selection so much.  As always, a large amount of my concern comes down to what I feel are significant physical shortcomings.  While a player can do quite well, while being athletically average, his chances of success are rather slim when he is well below average for his position group.  In Upshaw's case, being average would be a massive improvement. 

Player                            Kangaroo Score          Agility Score          Total Score
Courtney Upshaw               -0.754                          -0.843                     -0.743

You can click here to compare these numbers to some of his peers.  The scores above are given in terms of how many standard deviations, above or below average, that a player is when compared to players in his position group.  Basically, his Kangaroo Score suggests that he doesn't have the explosiveness or power to be an effective bull rusher.  His even worse Agility Score would mean it is unlikely that he would excel at executing more elaborate pass rushing moves, and he would also probably struggle to drop back into coverage.  Out of 568 outside linebacker/defensive end prospects, for whom we have data, Upshaw's -0.743 Total Score places him as the 515th rated prospect, in terms of athletic ability.  His one redeeming quality is his mass, weighing 272 pounds at the combine (now he has supposedly ballooned up to 285), so he can at least serve as a hefty speed bump.  I think it is clear that there is a very good, and obvious, reason why he fell so much further than he was expected to.

It's true, though, that his stats at Alabama were quite good.  In his last to years in college, he averaged 15.75 tackles for a loss, and totaled 15.5 sacks in those same years.  Still, he was playing on what might have been the best defense in college football.  Their defensive front seven probably outweighed their opponent's defense by 15 pounds per person.  The Alabama defense tends to be quite large.  Things like that probably matter a lot at the college level, where running the ball is still emphasized a bit more. 

Some would suggest that he was mainly expected to be a run stopper, in the Jarret Johnson mold.  First of all, Jarret Johnson was still probably a better pass rusher than Upshaw.  Johnson's Kangaroo Score of  -0.167 (slightly below average), suggested at least some mediocre possibility as a pass rusher, even if his Agility Score was an atrocious -1.558.  One has to consider though, that Johnson attended the combine as a 284# defensive tackle, so his Agility Score would quite likely be better at his current 260# playing weight.  Secondly, Johnson was taken in the fourth round, which is a more suitable place to select a player with his somewhat limited skills.  Comparisons to Jarret Johnson also avoid the question of whether stopping the opponent's running game should really be the emphasis of what a 3-4 OLB is doing in the first place.  Johnson was a very likeable player, but I don't think he serves as a great model for what a 3-4 OLB should ideally look like.  Personally, I think that if you are that concerned about stopping the run, you should address that issue with your defensive line and middle linebackers.

At this point the local fans still seem to think that Upshaw will develop into something special, largely because they have seen it happen in the past with the Ravens' first round picks.  They point to Upshaw's 60 tackles, and 1.5 sacks in his rookie year as signs of his potential.  Or, they can also talk about his forced fumble in the 2013 Super Bowl.  The problem with this is that a player is going to inevitably accumulate some sort of stats just by being allowed to go on the field.  What, precisely, is the most insignificant amount of production a player can be expected to have while being able to start in 11 games (including the post-season)?   What I find most interesting is that Albert McClellan accumulated almost identical stats, in the same number of starts, on the same team, yet nobody seems to care about him (though I think he could turn out to be better than Upshaw, if given the same opportunity).  Being your team's first pick certainly seems to garner you a lot of faith and goodwill, that an undrafted player like McClellan will probably never receive.

Ravens' History of Wide Receivers

I probably shouldn't say what I am about to say, since it could come off as a bit mean spirited.  Unfortunately, I just can't help myself.  Eric DeCosta was recently interviewed about the the team's approach towards drafting wide receivers.  In specific, he was asked what they have learned from their apparent success with the Torrey Smith pick, and this is what he said:

“Torrey Smith, in my mind, what makes him special is his personality, his makeup, his work ethic, his demeanor, his drive.”  - Eric DeCosta, a well intentioned, but misguided individual

You can read the whole thing here, though you may want to shoot yourself in the head afterwards.  Now, DeCosta seems like a good guy, and he and Ozzie have done many clever things over the years.  For this reason alone, I am going to pretend that he is just saying this nonsense because it is the sort of stuff many fans seem to eat up.  It feels good to think of Torrey as being a hard worker who has busted his ass every step of the way to get where he is.  It might even be true that he is a very determined guy, who brings his lunch pail to work (please shoot me now), but I really don't care.

If the team really believes this sort of stuff, then we are probably screwed.  In all likelihood, they probably do believe it.  It might very well explain their 16.66% success rate at drafting wide receivers.  If they really think that Torrey turned out well because of his grit and moxie, and not because he just happens to be a freak athlete, with a history of good college production, then they are quite possibly insane.

For the sake of simplicity, let's look at the Ravens' selections, from 2004 to 2012, through the eyes of my somewhat merciless computer.  We will be using the same simple method I used here.  That link will also show you a how a fairly wide array of well known receivers scored, to provide some context for what follows.  Every draft pick will be scored according to how many standard deviations above, or below, average they were in terms of adjusted statistical college production.  Similarly they will be graded by how many standard deviations they are above, or below, average athletically.  Since I use two different scales to score receivers, depending on their size, I will specify in the combined score which scale was used.  I'll list the players in reverse chronological order.

Player                    Pick #             Stat Score        Athletic Score       Combined Score
Tommy Streeter    236, in 2012        -0.520               0.378                     0.018 (Big)
Tandon Doss        123, in 2011          0.197              -0.546                    -0.174 (Small)
Torrey Smith          58, in 2011         0.637                0.648                     0.643(Small)
David Reed          156, in 2010          -0.111              -0.499                    -0.305(Small)
Justin Harper        215, in 2008         -0.671              -0.078                    -0.315(Big)
Marcus Smith       106, in 2008          0.511                0.024                     0.219(Big)
Yamon Figurs         74, in 2007         -1.164              -0.809                    -0.986(Small)
Demetrius Williams 111,in 2006           N/A                  N/A                         N/A
Mark Clayton          22, in 2005        0.400               -0.037                     0.181(Small)
Derek Abney         244, in 2004          N/A               -0.959                        N/A
Clarence Moore    199, in 2004        0.511               -0.348                     0.011(Big)
Devard Darling        82, in 2004       -0.095                0.629                     0.339(Big)

Out of 12 receivers selected, only four had scores that could be described as average or better, in both categories simultaneously.  These players are Torrey Smith, Marcus Smith, Mark Clayton, and Devard Darling.  Of these four who met the computer's minimal standards, 50% (Mark Clayton and Torrey Smith) managed to become at least average (Clayton's athletic score is only a fart's breadth below average).  Torrey's scores obviously crushed everyone else by a good margin.  So, when a player has at least some measure of decent athletic ability, and a collegiate history of production, things have worked out okay for the Ravens.  If we take Eric DeCosta's comments seriously, then the others simply failed because they didn't try hard enough, and not because they were just sub-par prospects to begin with.

We can even look at some "what if" scenarios, to see where the team might have misjudged value.  When Mark Clayton was selected with the 22nd pick, the team could have had Roddy White (1.171 stat score, 0.659 athletic score, 0.885 combined) taken with the 27th pick.  Or, in the same draft, Vincent Jackson (1.914 stat score, 2.089 athletic score, 2.019 combined) taken with the 61st pick.  Instead of Devard Darling, they could have drafted Jerricho Cotchery (0.806 stat score, 0.443 athletic score, 0.588 combine) who was taken with 108th pick.  The possibilities are endless, and probably somewhat pointless to contemplate.

An argument could be made that some of the other players that the Ravens drafted would have become productive if the team had employed better quarterbacks.  This opens a whole other can of worms, and second guessing.  For now, I would prefer to leave that issue alone.

There is one player who should never be left unmentioned in a discussion such as this one.  He is a player who tormented us all for years with his mediocrity, yet was the highest drafted receiver the Ravens ever selected.  In retrospect, it  seems obvious why he failed.

Player                Pick #          Stat Score         Athletic Score           Combined Score
Travis Taylor  10, in 2000         -0.588                 -0.185*                       -0.383  

*Based on using the average short shuttle time, since that piece of data was missing.